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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the construction industry in Japan
and the United States based on the statistics for the last
twenty years to uncover the similarities as well as the
differences.
In the first part of this thesis, Japanese construction
industry in the national economy is analyzed in comparison
with the U.S. construction industry. Input-output analysis
is employed to illustrate structural differences between the
construction industries in the two countries and structural
changes from the time horizons.
The second part analyzes the individual construction
establishments to identify the structure, organization
intra-industry dependency in the construction industry
paying regard to the size of the company in particular.
The third part describes the peculiar roll of large
size general contractors in Japan. Their features are
discussed both from intra and inter industry perspectives.
As a case study, development of construction robots by them
are discussed.
This thesis concludes with their technology oriented
strategy, based on their characteristics uncovered in this
thsesis, to enter into overseas market.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
The construction industry plays an essential role in
the national economy. Its output accounts for great
proportion of Gross National Product and serves and
accommodates people for a long period as a fixed asset. Its
production process involves a lot of intermediate input from
various industries and creates a lot of employment.
The construction market is considered to be a demand-
push market and is affected seriously by the national
economy. However, due to the constant upward economy after
the World War II and the government policy to increase
public construction during the recession, the construction
industry in Japan had never experienced serious recession
until the first oil crisis.
From the nature of construction, it used to be
considered as a regional and domestic industry.
Nevertheless, as the technology involved in construction
becomes more complex and the size of a project increases,
international construction began to play important role.
Construction firms in Japan, however, stayed in the
domestic market until the first oil crisis. There were
several minor reasons why they were relatively reluctant to
go into international markets, such as language problems,
cultural problems, geographical and various risks. However,
the major reason is that they did not have the necessity to
go out to expand their business due to the active domestic
market.
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After the first oil crisis, general contractors found a
shrinking domestic market and lots of resources both human
and assets accumulated during the 50's and 60's on hand.
Thus, general contractors first seriously considered to go
out into international market to make up for the shrinking
domestic market.
It was fortunate that the international construction
market was very active especially in the OPEC countries due
to the escalating oil price, in that it forced Japanese
construction firms to enter into this overseas market. The
recessive domestic economy in Japan, at this time, further
encouraged this international expansion.
Judging from the amount of contract, general
contractors appeared to had successfully launched into the
international market. Since the early 80's, however, as the
active construction investment in the Middle East ended by
the Iran-Iraqi war, they have had the hardest time ever.
In December 1985, one book, entitled as Kensetsuqyo no
Mirai Senryaku (Future Strategies of Construction Firms),
was published by a group of members working for Shimizu
Corporation. Surprisingly, it soon became a nationwide best
selling book. It proposes several strategy to survive in
the construction industry on the recognition that the
construction industry is now suffering the hardest time
ever. The public's concern about this book reflects the
seriousness and magnitude of problem facing the construction
industry.
The motivation of this thesis is basically the same as
this book. This thesis, however, focuses what we presently
have rather than what we should have in order to uncover the
strengths and weaknesses of general contractors in Japan.
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the
characteristics of general contractors in Japan and to
propose strategies to expand their business into the
international construction market.
The organization of this thesis is shown in figure 1.1.
Topics are changed from broader ones to more specific ones
as each chapter proceeds. In chapter two and chapter
three, the construction industry is analyzed as a sector of
the national economy. The framework of Input-Output analysis
is employed in chapter three. Chapter four discusses the
structure in the construction industry, focusing the size of
construction firms and their roles in particular. Chapter
five focuses the big five general contractors in Japan to
identify their characteristics. Chapter six discusses
construction robots developed by them as a case study and to
propose a strategy to develop construction robots. In
chapter seven, their activities in the overseas
construction after the first oil crisis are analyzed.
Finally in chapter eight, a strategy to expand into foreign
construction markets is proposed.
Figure 1.1 Organization of the Thesis
Subject U.S.A. Japan Case Study
Introduction
The Construction
Industry in the
National Econon
Input-Output
Analysis
Structure in the
Construction
Industry
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Contractors in
I Chapter 2
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I Chapter 4 I
Japan
Construction Robots
Developed in Japan
Overseas Construction
Conclusion & Further Study
Chapter 1
Chapter 4
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
I
I Chapter 6II II 7  I
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CHAPTER 2 CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY IN NATIONAL ECONOMY
2.1 Introduction
In the next two chapters, the construction industry in
Japan is analyzed as a sector of the national economy for
the last two decades mainly in comparison with that of the
United States. The second chapter discusses the role of the
construction industry in the framework of the national
economy such as gross domestic product, fixed capital
formation and construction investment. The third chapter
employs Input-Output tables to analyze structural changes in
the construction industry and to find similarity and
difference between the two countries after World War II.
Analysis in this chapter is based on System of National
Account (SNA) and National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA's), which are national account systems of Japan and
the United States. Fundamentals of these account systems
are provided in appendix 1 at the end of this chapter.
2.2.1 Construction Industry in Japan
After World War II, Japan's economy grew very rapidly.
The construction industry also continued to expand and
modernize at an increasing speed favored by Japan's
nationwide needs for socioeconomic reconstruction,
rehabilitation and redevelopment. From the mid 40's to the
mid 50's, the construction industry had developed mainly to
restore the lost national wealth through World War II, which
was almost 25 percent of the national wealth before the war.
[Miura, 1977, pp.17] It was not until 1955 that accumulated
assets reached the level of 1940. From 1955, Japan's
economy went into a so called "High Growth Era". Its GNP
had increased at a real annual compound rate of 8.4 percent,
10.0 percent and 11.3 percent between the years 1955 and
1960, 1960 and 1965, and 1965 and 1970 respectively. As a
result, Japan's GNP had risen from the seventh among liberal
countries to the second to the United States in 1967.
This rapid economic growth had been supported and had
supported the high rate of fixed capital formation. All
through this period, the ratio of Gross Domestic Fixed
Capital Formation to Gross Domestic Product (GDFCF/GDP) had
been almost 30 percent of which almost 70 percent had been
construction investment in nominal terms. Therefore, the
ratio of construction investment to GDP had been about 20
percent during that period. This rate is the highest among
developed countries and almost twice as much as that of the
U.S..
Table 2.1
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GDP and Construction Investment (1970)
Country Unit (A) Construction (B) GDP (A)/(B)
Investment %
JAPAN B.YEN 14634 73238 20.0 %
U.S.A. B.DOLLAR 95 986 9.6 %
U.K. B.POND 4059 51365 7.9 %
W. GERM. B.MARK 105 675 15.6 %
FRANCE B.FRANC 98 782 12.4 %
ITALY B.LIRA 7792 57937 13.4 %
Source: Year Book Construction Statistics 1979, 1980
This high rate of construction investment remains the
same until 1980 in nominal terms. (Figure 2.1) This
exceptionally high rate of construction investment as a part
of GDP can be explained by the low accumulation of capital
assets in Japan. With all this high rate of construction
investment, the accumulated capital assets both in
residential buildings and social infrastructure are still
far behind the average of developed countries. (Figure 2.3
and Figure 2.4)
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Figure 2.1 Ratio of Construction Investment to GDP (Japan)
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Figure 2.2 Ratio of Construction Investment to GNP (U.S.A.)
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Figure 2.3 Social and Residential Stock per Capita
(1000 dollar)
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Although the proportion of construction investment to
GDP appears almost constant except for 1972 and 1973 when
the proportion grew exceptionally high due to the active
investment stimulated by the economic peak, their proportion
in 1980 constant yen, however, shows that the magnitude of
construction investment has gradually decreased from 21.66
percent in 1965 to 17.81 percent in 1983 while it is 17.8
percent in 1965 and 17.1 percent in 1983 in nominal terms.
(Figure 2.1)
2.2.2 Construction Industry in the United States
In the United States, Private Domestic Investment (PDI)
has been around 15 percent of GNP. New construction put in
place by the private sector accounts for about 45 percent of
PDI or 7 to 8 percent of GNP. In addition, the construction
put in place by the public sector is almost 2 percent of
GNP. Therefore, construction put in place both by private
and public sectors is about 10 percent of GNP during the
last twenty years in current dollar. (Figure 2.2)
The ratio of construction investment to GNP seems to
have decreased gradually with some cyclical fluctuations
during the last two decades.
2.3 Cost Escalation of Construction in Japan
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show deflators of GDP, GNP, Fixed
Capital Formation (FCF), and construction investment for
both Japan and the United States. It shows that these
deflators are very close to one another in the United States
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while those of Japan indicate that cost escalation of
construction investment is much faster than the others.
Particularly, it is faster than FCF, showing that the cost
escalation of the construction is much more serious than
those of products of the manufacturing industry, which
account the rest 30 percent of FCF. This fast cost
escalation makes shrinking magnitude of the construction
industry less significant in Japan.
2.3.1 Cost Escalation of Labor
This serious cost escalation of construction investment
in Japan is due to two factors: labor cost and intermediate
input cost. The wages of construction workers has increased
significantly during the last twenty years especially for
the non-regular workers. They had suffered considerable low
wage levels before the "High Growth Era" compared with other
industries. However, economic growth in the 60's and the
early 70's have changed the supply and demand balance and
increased their wages. For instance, the wages of non-
regular workers has increased 45.5 percent in 1973. The
wages of regular workers also has increased since 1955. The
average wage of construction workers was 14,609 yen per
month and that of the manufacturing industry was 16,717 yen
in 1955 while the former has increased to 71,727 and the
latter to 71,447 by 1973. Thus, by the early 70's,
construction wages reached the manufacturing industry
average and, indeed, had exceed it.
Figure 2.5 Deflators (Japan)
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Figure 2.6 Deflators (U.S.A.)
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This cost escalation of wages by the early 70's is
depicted in figure 3.3 in chapter three. It shows that
before the first oil crisis, the cost index of wages had
increased much faster than that of construction materials.
2.3.2 Cost Escalation of Construction Materials
The cost of construction materials also had escalated
especially during the oil crisis as the construction
industry depends much on the imported material. The cost of
construction material has escalated 27.2 percent in 1974.
Foreign exchange rate also affects the cost escalation.
When Japanese currency is depreciated, the cost escalates
very quickly while yen is appreciated, it is stable.
2.4 Magnitude of Construction Industry
As a result of this cost escalation of construction,
construction investment has lost its magnitude as a part of
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation (GDFCF) besides this
decline of construction investment in real numbers. Figures
2.7 and 2.8 show the ratio of 4onstruction investment to
GDFCF in Japan and that of private construction investment
to PDFI in the U.S.. Although it stays almost constant
about 60 percent in nominal terms, it has decreased from
83.4 percent in 1965 to 58.8 percent in 1983 in real terms.
It shows that manufacturing industry had somehow, most
probably by increasing productivity, minimized it's cost
escalation while the construction industry could not
increase productivity that much.
Figure 2.7 Ratio of Construction Investment to GDFCF (Japan)
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Figure 2.8 Ratio of Construction Investment to PDFI
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Thus, although the cost escalation of construction
inflated the construction investment in nominal terms, the
importance of the construction industry seems to have
decreased in the national economy especially in the fixed
capital formation during the past two decades in Japan.
This trend is most easily observed since the late 70's when
the manufacturing industry began to focus on so called
the "high-tech" products.
This trend is also observed in the United States,
although it is less significant. The proportion of
construction investment to GNP has decreased from 12.6
percent in 1965 to 8.5 percent in 1984 in 1982 constant
dollar while it has decreased only from 10.5 percent in 1965
to 8.3 percent in 1984 in nominal terms. (Figure 2.2)
2.5 Market Structure
During the last two decades, the market structure of
the construction industry also has changed. In this
section, these changes in the construction market together
with the similarities and differences between the
construction markets of the two countries are discussed.
2.5.1 Public vs. Private
New construction put in place by the public and the
private sectors is shown in figure 2.9 for Japan and figure
2.10 for the U.S.. Back in 1965, public construction
counted about 30 percent of total new construction both in
the U.S. and in Japan. Until 1970, it used to be more than
30 percent in the U.S. which is slightly higher than that of
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Japan which was between 25 percent and 30 percent.
Nevertheless, in Japan, this segment had risen from 29
percent in 1971 to 41 percent in 1978 and has stayed
relatively constant while in the U.S., it has decreased
gradually from 30 percent in 1975 to 18 percent in 1984. As
a result, Japan's public construction is almost twice as
much as that of the U.S. percentagewise recently. This
difference seems to come from the disparity of government
policies. In the U.S., the rate of public construction
investment to government expenditure has decreased from
12.6 percent in 1965 to 7.5 percent in 1982 while that of
Japan stays over 30 percent until 1980. Nevertheless, there
is a tendency to decrease public construction also in Japan
and it has decreased slightly since 1977. As Japanese
government seems to continue this policy to reduce the size
of government, this high rate of Japanese public
construction is expected to decrease in the near future.
2.5.2 Type of Construction
New construction put in place by the type of
construction is shown in figure 2.11 for Japan and figure
2.12 for the U.S.. The major characteristic of the Japanese
construction market is that the proportion of heavy
construction is considerably high, almost 40 percent, all
through the last twenty years. In particular, heavy
construction by the public sector has increased from 19.6
percent in 1965 to 31.5 percent in 1985, showing the
government's emphasis on the social capital formation. On
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the contrary, heavy construction by the private sector has
decreased from 17.9 percent to 8.1 percent during the same
period, indicating that the social and economic environment
make it difficult for the private sector to invest in social
assets. However, aforementioned Japanese policy to decrease
public construction, at the same time, encourages private
sector's investment in social assets and provides incentives
for it. In other words, Japanese government has encouraged
privatization in the last few years. Therefore, the
proportion of private heavy construction is expected to
increase and to offset the decrease in public construction
to some extent in the future.
In the U.S., the proportion of construction investment
by type of construction appears to fluctuate significantly.
Residential investment, in particular, fluctuate heavily.
For instance, it has decreased 23.3 percent in one year from
1972 to 1973 and increased 46.3 percent in one year from
1983 to 1984. This significant fluctuation affects -the
whole construction industry considerably because the
residential construction accounts for almost 40 percent of
total construction on average in the U.S., whereas it is
about 30 percent in Japan. This relative importance and
heavy fluctuation of residential construction deform the
structure of the construction market and caused other types
of construction segments to fluctuate. However, in terms of
real construction volume, non residential and heavy
construction are more stable in the United States.
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Figure 2.9 Private vs. Public Construction (Japan)
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Figure 2.10 Private vs. Public Construction (U.S.A.)
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Figure 2.11 Type of Construction (Japan)
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Table 2.2 shows average and standard deviation of percent
increase of each construction investment in real terms. It
shows that for residential construction Japan has the least
standard deviation while the U.S. has the greatest standard
deviation. Other construction activities, non residential
building and heavy construction, show less standard
deviation in the United States.
Table 2.2 Average and Standard Deviation of
Percent Increase by Kind of Construction
(from 1966 to 1983 for Japan)
(from 1966 to 1984 for U.S.A.)
Japan The United States
Average S.D. Average S.D.
Public 4.86% 10.77 -1.98% 4.48
Private 6.50% 10.53 2.59% 9.51
Heavy Construct. 5.20% 10.68 -0.10% 4.79
BLDG. Construct. 6.23% 9.97 1.37% 9.77
Residential 6.08% 9.36 2.92% 17.26
Non Residential 6.95% 12.35 .0.29% 7.04
Note: Percent increase from previous year
Source: Kensetsu Toukei Youran, 1985, 1975
Construction Review, 1965 - 1985
Compiled by the author
in real terms.
2.6 Summary of Chapter Two
1) The ratio of construction investment to GDP is
almost 20 percent in Japan which is the highest
among developed countries and almost twice as much
as that of the U.S..
2) Cost escalation of construction industry is
relatively higher in Japan.
3) The ratio of construction investment to GDP in real
terms has decreased both in Japan and in the United
States. It is less significant in the U.S..
4) The ratio of construction investment to GDFCF has
decreased significantly in Japan especially in the
late 70's.
5) The proportion of public construction used to be
about 30 percent of total construction in both
countries. Now, however, it has increased in Japan
to 40 percent and decreased in the United States to
20 percent.
6) Heavy construction's share is higher in Japan and
housing construction's share is higher in the U.S..
7) Except for residential construction, construction
investment is more stable in the United States than
in Japan.
APPENDIX 1 SNA and NIPA's
System of National Account (SNA) is a system of
macroeconomic statistics which record the whole economic
activity of the country prepared by Japanese Economic
Planning Agency since 1970. SNA is almost the same account
system as the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA's)
which is provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) for the United States since 1972.
Figures 2.13 and 2.14 show schematic designs of the
SNA and NIPA's respectively. In the upper left square of
these systems is the use matrix, a matrix that shows
commodity input to a kind of economic activity (industry).
Every cell in this matrix represents yen (or dollar in the
United States) amount of intermediate input of the commodity
at the left of the row to the industry at the top of the
column. Therefore, the column sum of the matrix is the
total intermediate inputs of the industry and the row sum of
the matrix shows total intermediate output of the commodity.
In the row of construction commodity, all intermediate
output is maintenance and repair construction (M&R) such as
rehabilitation and remodeling because the new construction
is capitalized as fixed assets which belongs to the final
demand sector. In Japan all maintenance and repair
construction is classified as intermediate output while in
the United States, about 20 percent of the maintenance and
repair construction is capitalized and included in Private
Domestic Investment in final demand sector.
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This use matrix is very similar to the Input-Output
table (I-0 table), which will be explained later in the
third chapter, but not the same because of the difference
of the definition of a sector, an industry and a commodity.
In a I-0 table both columns and rows represent industrial
sectors while, in the use matrix, columns and rows represent
industries and commodities respectively. An industry
category is defined by Miller and Blair as a cluster of
establishments as classified by Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) code according to their primary or
characteristic products. A commodity is defined as a
characteristic product of SIC code whether the product is
produced as primary or secondary goods or services. [Miller
and Blair, 1985] According to Tiebout, sectors and
industries are defined as follows; "industries refer to
aggregates of firms producing similar product. Sectors refer
to kind of market industries serve" [Tiebout, 1962]. Thus
the concept of a sector is that every sector produces only a
primary product, and therefore there is no difference
between an industry and a commodity. Although the use
matrix is theoretically less pure than the I-0 table, and,
therefore, cannot be used in Input-Output analysis directly,
it has several advantages over the I-0 table as follows:
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1) It require less effort and time to construct.
2) It has greater compatibility with other statistics
that are usually provided by the industry.
3) It is useful when analyzing a real industry.
4) Deflators are often provided and therefore numbers
can be changed into real terms.
The rectangle below the use matrix shows the value
added sector. As SNA employs domestic concept rather than
national concept, this shows the structure of Gross Domestic
Product of Japan. Value added sector, or GDP, consists
mainly of four components: 1) Employees' Compensation, 2)
Operation Surplus, 3) Capital Assets Depreciation and 4)
Indirect Tax. In the United States, this sector is called
"charges against Gross National Product" and operation
surplus and capital assets depreciation are combined into
profit type income. The column sum of the value added
sector of an industry shows the GDP by the industry (or GNP
by the industry in the U.S.).
To the right of the use matrix is the final demand
sector. It shows the Yen (or $) amount of the commodity
purchased by households and government, Capital Formation
and Net Export. The total amount of the final demand is the
Gross Domestic Expenditure (GDE), or Gross National Product
(GNP) in the United States. GDE consists of: 1) Private
Final Consumption Expenditure, 2) Government Final
Consumption Expenditure (which does not include Public
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Capital Formation), 3) Gross Domestic Capital Formation,
which includes all construction investment, and 4) Export
net of Import. In NIPA's, final demand sector consists of
1) Private Consumption Expenditure, 2) Government Purchase
(which does include Public Capital Formation), 3) Gross
Private Domestic Investment (which does not include Public
Capital Formation) and 4) Export net of import. The row sum
of the final demand sector of a commodity is Gross Domestic
Expenditure (GDE) by the commodity. The cell at the
intersection of the row of construction and the column of
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation, which is Gross
Domestic Capital Formation net of inventory increase, shows
the (domestic) construction investment. GDE is equal to GDP
but GDE by the industry is not equal to GDP by the industry
(or commodity).
The difference between domestic concept, which is used
in Japan, and national concept, which is used in the United
States is that the latter includes the net receipt of factor
income from the rest of the world. This difference is less
than 1 percent both in the United states and in Japan;
therefore, in this analysis of the construction industry the
difference is negligible.
Schematic design of
Systems of National Account (SNA)
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Figure 2.14 Schematic Design of
National Income and Products Accounts (NIPA's)
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CHAPTER 3 INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the construction industry is analyzed
using the framework of Input-Output analysis to find the
structural similarities and differences between the
construction industries of the United States and Japan and
to identify their changes from the point of time horizons.
Fundamentals of the Input-Output analysis and
definitions of terms used in this chapter are provided in
appendix two at the end of this chapter.
3.2 Input Pattern of Construction Industry
Direct input requirement of the United States and
Japanese construction industry are shown in table 3.1 and
table 3.2 respectively. In general, the input pattern of
the Japanese construction industry has changed significantly
during the twenty years from 1960 to 1980 whereas that of
the United States appears stable during the thirty years
from 1947 to 1977.
In Japan, on the one hand, direct input from
manufacturing industry has significantly decreased. While
on the other hand, direct input from other industry have
generally increased. Particularly, direct input from the
value added sector, the service industry, financial services
and the trade and transportation has increased
significantly.
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Table 3.1 Direct-Input Requirements of Construction Industry
(Japan)
Sector \ Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Agriculture 0.0081 0.0024 0.0015 0.0011 0.0015
Mining 0.0160 0.0316 0.0216 0.0193 0.0201
Manufacturing 0.5203 0.4220 0.4479 0.3634 0.3760
Construction 0.0010 0.0009 0.0014 0.0002 0.0011
Utility 0.0023 0.0056 0.0048 0.0068 0.0091
Finance 0.0576 0.0745 0.0744 0.0783 0.0801
Transportation 0.0415 0.0426 0.0338 0.0503 0.0418
Service 0.0061 0.0077 0.0190 0.0223 0.0339
N.A.D. (1) 0.0311 0.0132 0.0178 0.0232 0.0074
---------------------------------------------
SUB TOTAL 0.6842 0.6278 0.6221 0.5650 0.5775
Value Added 0-.3158 0.3722 0.3779 0.4350 0.4225
TOTAL 1 1 1 1 1
N.B.: (1) Not adequately distributed.
Source: Minami, 1986.
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Table 3.2 Direct-Input Requirements of Construction Industry
(U.S.A.)
Sector \ Year 1947 1958 1963 1967 1972 1977
Agriculture 0.0031 0.0034 0.0038 0.0025 0.0028 0.0035
Mining 0.0094 0.0109 0.0086 0.0090 0.0090 0.0091
Construction 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0011
Manufacturing 0.3795 0.3831 0.3703 0.3637 0.3521 0.3720
T & T (1) 0.1324 0.1219 0.1147 0.1049 0.1014 0.1096
Service 0.0634 0.0615 0.0671 0.0765 0.0731 0.0792
Other 0.0011 0.0014 0.0012 0.0008 0.0028 0.0032
-------------------------------------------------
SUB TOTAL 0.5893 0.5823 0.5661 0.5577 0.5415 0.5778
Value Added 0.4107 0.4177 0.4339 0.4423 0.4585 0.4222
TOTAL INPUT 1 1 1 1 1 1
N.B.: (1) Trade and Transportation.
Source: Miller and Blair, 1985.
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The input from manufacturing industry has decreased
from 52.03 percent in 1960 to 36,34 percent in 1975 and has
slightly increased to 37.60 percent in 1980. This decrease
is almost offset by the increasing input from value added
sector. It has increased from 31.58 percent in 1960 to
43.50 percent in 1975 and slightly decreased to 42.25
percent in 1980.
These two changes in the input structure seem to be
inconsistent with the industrialization of construction
industry such as prefabrication that might have increased
the input from the manufacturing industry and decreased the
labor at site, i.e., input from the value added sector.
However, as direct input requirement is counted by
nominal Yen amount, it is hard to say whether these changes
came from technical changes or from changes in relative
price of products and wages. In order to identify it,
numbers should be changed into real terms.
In figure 3.1 total intermediate input and value added
are expressed in 1980 constant yen by using the deflators
provided by Japanese Economic Planning Agency since 1970.
It indicates that the proportion of value added has
decreased from 41.2 percent in 1970 to 37.5 percent in 1983
despite it's increase in nominal terms.
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Figure 3.1 Proportion of Value Added Sector to Total Output
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This decrease in real terms accords with the active
industrialization and increasing productivity in Japanese
construction industry. Thus, the difference in deflators
between intermediate input and value added, especially the
cost escalation of wages which is described in chapter two
is so great that deforms the input structure, in the next
two section, value added sector and intermediate input from
other sectors are discussed independently.
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3.3 Components of Value Added Sector
As mentioned in appendix one at the end of chapter two,
value added sector can be disaggregated into a few
components. In Japan, they are employees' compensation,
operation surplus, capital consumption and indirect tax. By
analyzing these numbers, labor intensity or capital
intensity of a sector can be observed.
The components of value added are shown in table 3.3.
In this table, as earnings of self employed workers are
included in the operation surplus and they constitute a
considerable part of the total construction workers, which
will be discussed in chapter four, it is hard to find total
employees' compensation. However, the obvious increase of
capital consumption is observed both in building, including
maintenance and repair construction, and heavy construction.
In building construction, it has increased from 3.96 percent
in 1960 to 7.66 percent in 1980. In the heavy construction,
it has increased from 6.83 percent in 1960 to 15.6 percent
in 1970 and decreased slightly afterwards reflecting the
downward economy after the oil crisis. This increased
capital consumption indicates active investment in
construction machinery by Japanese construction firms
especially in the so-called "High Growth Era" before the oil
crisis. Unfortunately, these data are not available for the
United States.
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Table 3.3 Component of Value Added in Percent (Japan)
Building construction (including M&R construction)
Component of V.A. \ Year 60 65 70 75 80
Exp. outside Household 4.23% 9.64% 7.59% 6.54% 6.07%
Compensation to Emp. 45.14% 52.81% 42.99% 46.95% 51.34%
Operation Surplus 45.83% 30.71% 39.28% 36.36% 32.17%
Capital Consumption 3.96% 4.17% 7.60% 7.42% 7.62%
Indirect Taxes 0.78% 2.66% 2.54% 2.74% 2.80%
Subsidy 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Value Added Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Heavy Construction
Component of V.A. \ Year 60 65 70 75 80
Exp. outside Household 3.69% 8.30% 5.71% 5.57% 4.67%
Compensation to Emp. 45.42% 68.29% 56.05% 57.78% 65.69%
Operation Surplus 43.39% 13.40% 21.18% 20.91% 15.97%
Capital Consumption 6.83% 8.43% 15.61% 15.12% 12.26%
Indirect Taxes 0.65% 1.57% 1.64% 1.58% 2.02%
Subsidy 0.00% 0.00% -0.06% -0.96% -0.62%
Value Added Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: Annual Report on National Accounts, 1963 - 1985
Compiled by the author
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3.4 Construction Investment per Worker
Simultaneously with this capital investment by the
Japanese construction industry, the productivity of worker,
which is defined as construction investment per worker in
real terms, has sharply increased. It has almost doubled
from 5,483,000 yen per worker in 1965 to 10,482,000 yen per
worker in 1972 in 1980 constant yen. In the U.S., however,
productivity does not show such increase during the last 20
years. Rather, it has declined slightly with some cyclical
fluctuations. Figure 3.2 shows workers productivity
assuming that of 1965 is 100. It trace almost the same line
as capital consumption by the Japanese construction
industry. Capital intensity of construction establishments
is discussed further in chapter four.
3.5 Changes in Intermediate Input
As described earlier in this chapter, the increasing
unit cost of labor deforms the direct input requirements of
Japanese construction industry and makes it difficult to
find changes in intermediate input structure. In order to
make them clearer, more detailed share of intermediate input
to the total intermediate input are prepared by tables in
appendix three at the end of this chapter. These tables are
constructed from 72 sector tables of Japan and 82 sector
tables of the United States. The major changes observed in
the two countries are summarized in table 3.4.
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Figure 3.2 Construction Investment per Worker
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Table 3.4 Changes in Intermediate Input Structure
TREND JAPAN U.S.A.
INCREASE Metal product Lumber & Wood
Misc.ind.product Electric machinery
Trade & transportation Service
Service
Utility (electricity)
Finance & Insurance
DECREASE Wood Furniture
Steel & Iron Paint
Electric machinery Stone & clay product
Other Metal product
Steel and Iron
Transportation
Other
Source : Economic Statistics Annual
Survey of Current Business
Compiled by the author
Although these changes are less significant in the United
States, they make a clear contrast. Only input from the
service sector has increased both in Japan and in the U. S..
In Japan, it has increased from 0.8 percent in 1960 to 5.0
percent in 1980, and in the U.S. it has increased from 6.7
percent in 1947 to 9.9 percent in 1977. To be more
concrete, input from service sector consists of
architectural design, engineering, construction management
and testing laboratories.
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The increasing input from the service sector represents
the better quality required for construction in recent
years. Although this trend is more significant in Japan
where it has quadrupled in twenty years, it is still about
one half of that of the U.S..
Only input from steel and iron primary product is
decreasing both in Japan and in the U.S.. In Japan, it
has decreased from 11.5 percent in 1960 to 5.4 percent in
1980. This decrease is almost replaced by the increase of
metal product which has increased from 11.65 percent in 1960
to 19.2 percent in 1980. It has lost its share from 6.6
percent in 1947 to 3.9 percent in 1977 in the U.S.. In
general, the use of primary steel products is greater in
Japan reflecting the heavy construction oriented market
structure and the structural requirement by the earthquakes.
Nevertheless, this trend of decreasing input of primary
steel product is mainly contributed by its low cost
escalation rate because the input of cement and ready mixed
concrete, which is the other material to form reinforced
concrete structure and belongs to the non-metal mineral
sector in Japan and the stone and clay product in the United
States, stays almost constant in both countries. In fact,
as shown in figure 3.3, the escalation of steel and iron
price index is less than that of the total construction
material.
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FIGURE 3.3 Wholesale Price Index of Construction Material
and Wage Index in Japan
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However, in Japanese non residential building the use
of concrete also is declining and the use of metal products,
of which fabricated steel structure constitutes almost 70
percent, have increased by 170 percent during the period.
It -indicates that the steel structure is replacing rein
forced concrete structure in non-residential buildings.
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Intermediate input from wood and lumber sector shows an
interesting contrast between the two countries. It has
increased from 9.7 percent in 1947 to 13.8 percent in 1977
in the U.S. while that of Japan has decreased from 22.1
percent in 1960 to 13.2 percent in 1980. In the United
States, both in 1977 and 1972, the economy enjoyed its peak
and housing construction increased dramatically. This
active housing construction obviously affected the increased
inputs from the wood and lumber sector. In Japan, although
most homes are traditionally made of wood and the use of
wood showed high proportion in the construction industry,
almost 60 percent of total wood is imported from foreign
countries, of which 50 percent comes from the U.S.. It is
by far the greatest imported product used in the
construction industry. However, the relative expensive
price of wood discourages its use of wood even in housing
construction. Moreover, the increasing proportion of
prefabricated houses, which was 15 percent in 1975 and 25
percent in 1984 has also accelerated this trend. As a
result, the ratio of total floor area of wooden structure to
the total floor area constructed has decreased from 41.6
percent in 1982 to 36.2 percent in 1984. [Kensetsu Hakusho,
1985]
To find more general changes of the input pattern of
the construction industry, aggregated tables are provided
in appendix three at the end of this chapter. In these
tables intermediate tangible input are classified by the
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degree of processing rather than the kind of material.
Aggregated eight sectors of these tables are;
1) Material and less processed product
2) Processed product
3) Machinery
4) Utility (Electric power supply)
5) Trade and transportation
6) Finance and Insurance
7) Service
8) Other
In the United States, almost no significant change except
for the increased input from service sector is observed
while considerable changes can be observed in Japan
especially in building construction.
First of all, on the one hand, input of material and
less processed product have decreased from 47.4 percent in
1960 to 37.0 percent in 1980 in total construction or from
52.6 percent in 1960 to 34.3 percent in 1980 for building
construction which includes maintenance and repair
construction. On the other hand, input of processed
products has increased from 15.3 percent to 20.6 percent in
total construction or from 16.1 percent to 26.8 percent in
building construction during the same period. As a result,
the rate of processed products to material and less
processed product has increased from about 30 percent in
1960 to 55 percent in 1980 in total construction and from 30
53
percent to 80 percent in building construction. In the
United States this rate stays constant at about 50 percent
for total construction and 80 percent in the building
construction. This increase of processed product shows
rapid industrialization of construction industry in Japan.
As a result, the input structure of the construction
industry became very similar in these two countries
throughout the late 70's.
3.6 Total requirement and Output Multiplier
"Total requirement (direct and indirect input
requirement) shows how much the total dollar production is
required from the industry at the top for each dollar of
delivery to final demand sector by the industry at the
left." [Miernyk, 1965]. The column sum of this matrix,
which is called output multiplier, shows total production
required to increase the sectors output by a unit. In
general, labor intensive industries such as service, mining
and agriculture in Japan show low output multipliers. Tables
3.5 and 3.6 show output multipliers of Japan and the U.S..
Japanese construction industry used to have relatively high
output multiplier. It was 2.701 in 1960 and was second only
to the manufacturing industry whose output multiplier was
2.704. This high output multiplier has decreased to about
2.4 by 1965 and has remained almost constant up until 1980.
Table 3.5 Output Multipliers (Japan)
YEAR AGR MIN MANU CONST UTIL FINC TANS SERV N.A.D.
60 1.701 1.725 2.704 2.701 1.769 1.470 1.759 1.522 2.558
65 1.734 1.741 2.535 2.359 1.665 1.410 1.651 1.494 2.374
70 1.779 1.760 2.550 2.427 1.719 1.447 1.619 1.752 2.080
75 1.880 2.056 2.654 2.362 2.131 1.491 2.347 1.775 2.862
80 2.119 2.126 2.779 2.427 2.252 1.520 2.464 1.886 3.268
Source: Economic Statistics Annual
Table 3.6 Output Multipliers (U.S.A.)
YEAR AGR MIN CONST MANU T&T SERV OTHR AVE.
47 2.113 1.565 2.220 2.319 1.524 1.804 1.898 1.920
58 2.143 1.624 2.204 2.286 1.562 1.782 2.066 1.952
63 2.216 1.677 2.156 2.272 1.523 1.697 1.927 1.924
67 2.239 1.687 2.127 2.238 1.538 1.684 1.832 1.907
72 2.295 1.680 2.085 2.254 1.464 1.608 1.108 1.785
77 2.338 1.675 2.208 2.354 1.573 1.648 1.144 1.848
Source: Survey of Current Business
Compiled by the author
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Table 3.7 Influencing Power Coefficients (Japan)
YEAR AGR MIN MANU CONST UTIL FINC TANS SERV N.A.D.
60 0.855 0.867 1.359 1.358 0.889 0.739 0.884 0.765 1.286
65 0.920 0.924 1.345 1.252 0.883 0.748 0.876 0.793 1.260
70 0.934 0.924 1.340 1.275 0.903 0.760 0.851 0.920 1.093
75 0.865 0.946 1.221 1.087 0.980 0.686 1.080 0.817 1.317
80 0.915 0.918 1.200 1.048 0.973 0.656 1.064 0.814 1.411
Source: Economic Statistics Annual
Compiled by the author
Table 3.8 Influencing Power Coefficients (U.S.A.)
YEAR AGR MIN CONST MANU T&T SERV OTHR AVE.
47 1.100 0.815 1.156 1.208 0.793 0.939 0.988 1.000
58 1.098 0.832 1.129 1.171 0.800 0.913 1.058 1.000
63 1.152 0.872 1.121 1.181 0.792 0.882 1.002 1.000
67 1.174 0.885 1.116 1.174 0.807 0.883 0.961 1.000
72 1.286 0.941 1.168 1.263 0.820 0.901 0.621 1.000
77 1.265 0.906 1.195 1.273 0.851 0.891 0.619 1.000
Source: Survey of Current Business
Compiled by the author
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During this period, however, other sectors such as
agriculture, mining, utility. and trade, have increased
their output multiplier almost by 25 percent. As a result,
the relative importance of the construction industry has
declined during the last two decades.
Miyazawa defines the influencing power coefficient as
the output multiplier divided by mathematical average of
output multiplier of all industries [Miyazawa ed., 1975].
In this coefficient, the size of the sector is ignored and,
therefore, it is not adequate for comparing two countries.
However, it might be useful to find changes in a country.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show influencing power coefficient
of Japan and the U.S.. -The influencing power coefficient of
Japanese construction industry shows sharp decline from 1.36
to 1.20 while that of the U.S. has increased slightly from
1.16 to 1.19 during the last three decades. Despite this
sharp declining influencing power coefficient, the output
multiplier does not show such decline mainly due to
increasing output multiplier of other sectors especially
that of the manufacturing industry which has increased from
2.55 in 1970 to 2.78 in 1980.
The relative high output multiplier is one
distinguishing feature of Japanese sectors in general. The
average output multiplier of Japanese sectors is 2.32
whereas that of the United States is 1.85. It might be
related to the dual structure which is frequently pointed
out as characteristic of Japanese industry especially in
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Manufacturing industry. Dual structure refers to the
subcontracting system which is employed to give stiff
organization characterized by lifetime employment system and
seniority system flexibility by subcontracting a
considerable proportion of production. It, therefore,
appears in the cell of total requirement from manufacturing
industry to manufacturing industry. In the most recent
tables it is 2.04 in Japan and 1.73 in the U.S..
3.7 Summary of Chapter Three
1) Inter-industry structure is more stable in the
United States than in Japan.
2) Value added in construction industry has increased
due to cost escalation of labor cost in Japan.
3) Intermediate input structure indicate the
active industrialization of Japanese construction
industry.
4) In the most recent I-0 tables, the U.S. and
Japanese construction industries shows similar
structure.
5) The proportion of less processed product and
processed product in intermediate input shows that
degree of industrialization in Japan exceeds that
of the U.S..
6) Output multiplier shows declining effect of
construction industry to the total industry.
APPENDIX 2 INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS
Input-Output analysis was first developed by Wassily
Leontief in 1936. The structure of Input-Output tables (I-0
tables), which forms the basis of this analysis, is almost
the same as SNA and NIPA's which are explained earlier in
chapter one. The difference is that I-0 tables use the
concept of sector rather than concept of industry and
commodity so that the row sum (output of a sector) is always
equal to the column sum (outlay of a sector). It makes the
I-0 tables a powerful tool for analyzing industries by
construction matrices such as A matrix and (I-A) inverse
matrix.
Input-output tables show flows of commodity and
services in monetary terms. A column of a I-0 table shows
input to the sector at the top of the column from sectors of
the row at the left. Input to a sector consists mainly of
two kinds of input; One is intermediate input from
processing sector and the other is input from value added
sector such as compensation to employees.
A row in a I-O table shows out put of a sector at the
left of the row to the sector at the top of the column.
Output of a sector also consists mainly of two kinds of
output; One is intermediate output to processing sectors
and the other is output to final demand sectors such as
private consumption expenditure.
Direct-input coefficient matrices is constructed from a
I-0 table by dividing intermediate input and value added by
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the total outlay of a sector (or by column normalizing the
I-0 tables). Direct-input coefficient is denoted by a and
ij
the direct-input coefficient matrix is denoted by A=[a ].
ij
It shows the input structure or price structure of a sector.
Each cell in the A matrix shows intermediate inputs per
unit production of a sector at the top of the column. The
column sum of the direct-input coefficient of intermediate
input is called "Backward Linkage", showing the proportion
of intermediate input to the total output of a sector.
Inverse matrices of direct-input coefficient matrices
show direct and indirect impact by increasing the total
output of a sector by a unit while the aforementioned
direct-input coefficient matrices only show direct impact of
increasing the total output by unit. Secondary and tertiary
effect of increasing output can be expressed by the power
1 2 3
series of I+A +A +A .... which is mathematically given by
(I-A) inverse matrix, where I is the identity matrix. This
matrix is also known by the name of Leontief's Inverse. The
column sum of this matrix shows direct and indirect
intermediate input generated by increasing the output of the
sector by a unit and is thus called the Output Multiplier.
Direct-output coefficient matrices are given by
dividing intermediate output of sectors by the total output
of the sectors (or by row normalizing the I-0 tables).
Direct-output coefficient is denoted by b and the direct-
ij
output coefficient matrix is denoted by B=[b ]. This
ij
matrices show the output structure of sectors. The row sum
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of the matrix is called "Forward Linkage" of the sector,
showing the proportion of intermediate output to the total
output of the sector. In the construction sector,
intermediate output consists of maintenance and repair
construction.
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Table 3.9 Intermediate Input Structure (Japan)
Building Construction (including M&R Construction)
SECTOR YEAR 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
(M)Other mining
(M)Miscellaneous fabric
(M)Wood milling
(P)Furniture
(M)Chemicals
(M)Petrol. product
(M)Nonmetal-mineral
(M)Steel
(P)Non-ferrous product
(P)Metal product
Machinery
Eclectic machinery
Transp. machinery
(P)Misc.indust.product
Electric powersuply
Trade
Finance&Insurance
Real estate rent
Transportation
Community service
Service
Other sectors
TOTAL INTEMED. INPUT
23.4
1.7%
30.0
2.2%
302.3
22.1%
36.8
2.7%
15.2
1.1%
11.0
0.8%
187.8
13.7%
147.1
10.7%
5.4
0.4%
158.2
11.6%
59.5
4.3%
56.1
4.1%
13.0
0.9%
25.5
1.9%
2.0
0.1%
103.3
7.5%
16.5
1.2%
0.0%
63.8
4.7%
0.9
0.1%
10.7
0.8%
100.2
7.3%
75.8
2.7%
53.5
1.9%
534.0
18.8%
103.2
3.6%
25.7
0.9%
24.5
0.9%
403.9
14.3%
198.4
7.0%
7.8
0.3%
418.9
14.8%
99.8
3.5%
123.4
4.4%
13.1
0.5%
56.6
2.0%
11.9
0.4%
301.2
10.6%
48.1
1.7%
0.0%
146.9
5.2%
11.7
0.4%
19.1
0.7%
156.9
5.5%
99.9
1.4%
78.3
1.1%
1209.1
17.1%
253.1
3.6%
50.6
0.7%
96.9
1.4%
1022.5
14.5%
432.0
6.1%
7.4
0.1%
1232.3
17.5%
197.6
2.8%
289.4
4.1%
45.3
0.6%
173.4
2.5%
27.4
0.4%
732.0
10.4%
113.6
1.6%
25.2
0.4%
297.6
4.2%
11.4
0.2%
216.6
3.1%
447.3
6.3%
162.7
1.3%
207.5
1.6%
1785.2
13.9%
583.1
4.5%
110.7
0.9%
33.4
0.3%
1612.0
12.5%
707.7
5.5%
125.0
1.0%
2320.0
18.0%
257.7
2.0%
685.5
5.3%
4.6
.0%
349.3
2.7%
94.9
0.7%
1479.8
11.5%
299.6
2.3%
88.7
0.7%
983.4
7.6%
32.4
0.3%
460.3
3.6%
482.4
192.0
1.0%
323.9
1.6%
2658.6
13.2%
879.9
4.4%
181.0
0.9%
85.7
0.4%
2369.2
11.8%
838.2
4.2%
239.1
1.2%
3872.0
19.3%
470.1
2.3%
618.9
3.1%
200.0
1.0%
634.4
3.2%
171.8
0.9%
2433.2
12.1%
370.3
1.8%
214.5
1.1%
1295.4
6.4%
135.8
0.7%
904.5
4.5%
997.9
3.7% 5.0%
1368.6 2834.4 7058.7 12865.9 20086.4
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Economic Statistics Annual, Compiled by the author
Table 3.9 Intermediate Input Structure
Heavy Construction
SECTOR \
(M)Other mining
(M)Miscellaneous f
(M)Wood milling
(P)Furniture
(M)Chemicals
(M)Petrol. product
(M)Nonmetal-minera
(M)Steel
(P)Non-ferrous prc
(P)Metal product
Machinery
Eclectic machin
Transp. machine
(P)Misc.indust.prc
Electric powers
Trade
Finance&Insurance
Real estate rent
Transportation
Community service
Service
Other sectors
TOTAL INTEMED. INPUT
YEAR 1960
27.6
3.4%
abric 1.2
0.1%
40.2
5.0%
0.8
0.1%
0.7
0.1%
28.7
3.6%
l 105.5
13.1%
104.0
12.9%
duct 2.1
0.3%
106.8
13.2%
17.4
2.2%
iery 110.5
13.7%
try 31.9
4.0%
duc t 4.1
0.5%
;uply 2.8
0.3%
51.6
6.4%
10.8
1.3%
0.0%
49.2
6.1%
0.6
0.1%
7.4
0.9%
104.0
12.9%
808.0
100.0%
Source: Economic Statistics Annual, Compiled by the author
(Japan, Cont'd)
1965
134.2
10.1%
0.6
.0%
50.0
3.7%
2.8
0.2%
2.5
0.2%
45.9
3.4%
191.4
14.3%
138.3
10.4%
1.9
0.1%
146.3
11.0%
55.2
4.1%
163.-7
12.3%
20.8
1.6%
7.0
0.5%
11.5
0.9%
113.6
8.5%
30.1
2.3%
0.0%
92.6
6.9%
8.5
0.6%
11.6
0.9%
105.5
7.9%
1334.0
100.0%
1970
250.6
8.2%
3.9
0.1%
50.2
1.6%
0.0
0.0%
10.1
0.3%
95.0
3.1%
537.0
17.6%
310.9
10.2%
1.0
.0%
341.4
11.2%
177.7
5.8%
291.3
9.5%
57.2
1.9%
13.7
0.4%
20.8
0.7%
273.3
8.9%
67.7
2.2%
29.4
1.0%
166.1
5.4%
5.6
0.2%
75.0
2.5%
277.9
9.1%
3055.8
100.0%
1975 1980
496.3 920.6
7.8% 7.8%
23.1 11.8
0.4% 0.1%
110.6 200.0
1.7% 1.7%
32.9 54.2
0.5% 0.5%
34.8 60.3
0.5% 0.5%
23.0 232.7
0.4% 2.0%
1301.0 2397.8
20.4% 20.3%
622.9 890.5
9.8% 7.5%
283.5 429.4
4.4% 3.6%
597.4 987.7
9.4% 8.4%
322.7 816.5
5.1% 6.9%
55.3 166.1
0.9% 1.4%
7.2 816.5
0.1% 6.9%
55.8 132.6
0.9% 1.1%
80.6 165.9
1.3% 1.4%
529.8 1041.6
8.3% 8.8%
181.3 254.6
2.8% 2.2%
80.6 107.6
1.3% 0.9%
613.0 813.7
9.6% 6.9%
13.0 85.5
0.2% 0.7%
218.7 701.1
3.4% 5.9%
701.7 535.3
11.0% 4.5%
6385.2 11822.2
100.0% 100.0%
Table 3.9 Intermediate
Total Construction
SECTOR \ YEAR
(M)Other mining
(M)Miscellaneous fabric
(M)Wood milling
(P)Furniture
(M)Chemicals
(M)Petrol. product
(M)Nonmetal-mineral
(M)Steel
(P)Non-ferrous product
(P)Metal product
Machinery
Eclectic machinery
Transp. machinery
(P)Misc.indust.product
Electric powersuply
Trade
Finance&Insurance
Real estate rent
Transportation
Community service
Service
Other sectors
TOTAL INTEMED. INPUT
Input Structure (Japan, Cont'd)
1960
51.0
2.3%
31.2
1.4%
342.5
15.7%
37.6
1.7%
15.9
0.7%
39.8
1.8%
293.4
13.5%
251.1
11.5%
7.4
0.3%
265.0
12.2%
76.9
3.5%
166.6
7.7%
44.9
2.1%
29.6
1.4%
4.8
0.2%
154.9
7.1%
27.3
1.3%
0.0
0.0%
113.0
5.2%
1.5
0.1%
18.1
0.8%
204.3
9.4%
2176.6
100.0%
Source: Economic Statistics Annual, Compiled by the author
• m | |
1965' 1970 1975 1980
210.0 350.5 659.0 1112.6
5.0% 3.5% 3.4% 3.5%
54.1 82.2 230.7 335.7
1.3% 0.8% 1.2% 1.1%
584.0 1259.3 1895.9 2858.6
14.0% 12.5% 9.8% 9.0%
106.1 253.1 616.0 934.1
2.5% 2.5% 3.2% 2.9%
28.2 60.7 145.5 241.4
0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 0.8%
70.4 191.9 56.4 318.5
1.7% 1.9% 0.3% 1.0%
595.3 1559.4 2913.1 4767.0
14.3% 15.4% 15.1% 14.9%
336.7 742.8 1330.6 1728.7
8.1% 7.3% 6.9% 5.4%
9.8 8.4 408.5 668.5
0.2% 0.1% 2.1% 2.1%
565.2 1573.7 2917.3 4859.6
13.6% 15.6% 15.2% 15.2%
155.0 375.3 580.3 1286.6
3.7% 3.7% 3.0% 4.0%
287.0 580.7 740.8 785.0
6.9% 5.7% 3.8% 2.5%
33.8 102.5 11.7 1016.6
0.8% 1.0% 0.1% 3.2%
63.5 187.1 405.0 767.0
1.5% 1.8% 2.1% 2.4%
23.4 48.2 175.5 337.8
0.6% 0.5% 0.9% 1.1%
414.9 1005.3 2009.6 3474.9
10.0% 9.9% 10.4% 10.9%
78.2 181.3 480.9 624.8
1.9% 1.8% 2.5% 2.0%
0.0 54.6 169.3 322.1
0.0% 0.5% 0.9% 1.0%
239.6 463.7 1596.3 2109.2
5.7% 4.6% 8.3% 6.6%
20.2 17.0 45.5 221.3
0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 0.7%
30.6 291.5 679.1 1605.6
0.7% 2.9% 3.5% 5.0%
262.5 725.2 1184.1 1533.2
6.3% 7.2% 6.2% 4.8%
4168.4 10114.4 19251.1 31908.6
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
New Construction
SECTOR \ YEAR 1958 1963
(M)Stone & Clay Mine 478
1.8% 1.2%
(M)Lumber & Wood 3553
9.7% 9.0%
(P)Furniture 526
1.5% 1.3%
(M)Chemicals 201
1.1% 0.5%
(M)Paints 308
0.6% 0.8%
(M)Petrol. product 1119
2.9% 2.8%
(M)Stone & Clay product 5813
12.1% 14.7%
(M)Steel 2125
6.6% 5.4%
(M)Non-ferrous Metals 1244
2.6% 3.1%
(P)Metal product 7246
15.4% 18.3%
Machinery 952
4.5% 2.4%
Eclectic machinery 2177
4.4% 5.5%
(P)Misc.indust. product 89
0.2% 0.2%
Utility 205
0.4% 0.5%
Trade 5453
14.7% 13.8%
Finance & Insurance 401
1.3% 1.0%
Real estate rent 307
0.6% 0.8%
Transportation 2143
5.3% 5.4%
Service 2959
7.6% 7.5%
Other sectors 2330
6.8% 5.9%
TOTAL INTERMED. INPUT 39629
100.0% 100.0%
Source: Survey of Current Business
Compiled by the Author
100. 0%
------ --
1967
670
1.4%
4550
9.5%
565
1.2%
136
0.3%
456
0.9%
1400
2.9%
6177
12.9%
1456
3.0%
2155
4.5%
9378
19.5%
1233
2.6%
2541
5.3%
111
0.2%
64
0.1%
6503
13.5%
572
1.2%
599
1.2%
2135
4.4%
4382
9.1%
2950
6.1%
48033
100.0%
1972
1030
1.4%
8896
11.9%
641
0.9%
328
0.4%
563
0.8%
1995
2.7%
9313
12.5%
2469
3.3%
2516
3.4%
14041
18.8%
1623
2.2%
4321
5.8%
174
0.2%
154
0.2%
10065
13.5%
748
1.0%
709
1.0%
3322
4.5%
7669
10.3%
4036
5.4%
74613
100.0%
1977
1074
0.9%
16086
13.8%
906
0.8%
399
0.3%
1573
1.3%
4771
4.1%
12630
10.8%
4569
3.9%
2782
2.4%
17443
14.9%
2346
2.0%
7417
6.3%
390
0.3%
603
0.5%
17064
14.6%
1843
1.6%
451
0.4%
4377
3.7%
14161
12.1%
5939
5.1%
116824
100.0%
able 3.10 Intermediate Input Structure (U.S.A.)
Table 3.10 Intermediate Input Structure
Maintenance and Repair Construction
SECTOR YEAR 1958
(M)Stone & Clay Mine
2.0%
(M)Lumber & Wood
6.4%
(P)Furniture
0.3%
(M)Chemicals
(M)Paints
(M)Petrol. product
(M)Stone & Clay Product
(M)Steel
(M)Non-ferrous Metals
(P)Metal product
Machinery
Eclectic machinery
(P)Misc.indust. product
Utility
Trade
Finance & Insurance
Real estate rent
Transportation
Service
Other sectors
TOTAL INTERMED. INPUT
1.1%
13.4%
5.7%
8.4%
4.2%
4.3%
13.5%
1.1%
4.4%
0.7%
0.4%
21.1%
0.8%
0.5%
4.6%
0.9%
6.3%
100.0% 1
Source: Survey of Current Busines
Compiled by the Author
1963 1967 1972
259 261 377
3.0% 2.7% 2.5%
723 396 824
8.3% 4.1% 5.4%
4 17 121
.0% 0.2% 0.8%
54 18 116
0.6% 0.2% 0.8%
859 868 1061
9.9% 9.0% 6.9%
540 624 1137
6.2% 6.5% 7.4%
410 697 1474
4.7% 7.2% 9.6%
317 296 285
3.7% 3.1% 1.9%
209 209 128
2.4% 2.2% 0.8%
838 1697 1469
9.7% 17.5% 9.6%
281 216 499
3.2% 2.2% 3.3%
489 764 1814
5.6% 7.9% 11.9%
77 91 138
0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
90 9 65
1.0% 0.1% 0.4%
1720 1723 2732
19.9% 17.8% 17.9%
161 86 293
1.9% 0.9% 1.9%
134 101 306
1.5% 1.0% 2.0%
490 478 934
5.7% 4.9% 6.1%
281 529 606
3.2% 5.5% 4.0%
727 592 899
8.4% 6.1% 5.9%
8663 9672 15278
00.0% 100.0% 100.0%
| 
•
1977
969
2.7%
2245
6.3%
370
1.0%
261
0.7%
1251
3.5%
2447
6.8%
3480
9.7%
1081
3.0%
770
2.1%
6538
18.2%
655
1.8%
2925
8.1%
129
0.4%
230
0.6%
6290
17.5%
467
1.3%
176
0.5%
1507
4.2%
1030
2.9%
3074
8.6%
35895
100.0%
(U.S.A., Cont'd)
s
Input Structure (U.S.A., Cont'd)
Total Construction
SECTOR \ YEAR
(M)Stone & Clay Mine
1958
(M)Lumber & Wood
(P)Furniture
(M)Chemicals
(M)Paints
(M)Petrol. product
(M)Stone & Clay Product
(M)Steel
(M)Non-ferrous Metals
(P)Metal product
Machinery
Eclectic machinery
(P)Misc.indust. product
Utility
Trade
Finance & Insurance
Real estate rent
Transportation
Service
Other sectors
TOTAL INTERMED. INPUT 4
1
Source: Survey of Current Business
Compiled by the Author
1963 1967
737 931
1.5% 1.6%
4276 4946
8.9% 8.6%
530 582
1.1% 1.0%
255 154
0.5% 0.3%
1167 1324
2.4% 2.3%
1659 2024
3.4% 3.5%
6223 6874
12.9% 11.9%
2442 1752
5.1% 3.0%
1453 2364
3.0% 4.1%
8084 11075
16.7% 19.2%
1233 1449
2.6% 2.5%
2666 3305
5.5% 5.7%
166 202
0.3% 0.4%
295 73
0.6% 0.1%
7173 8226
14.9% 14.3%
562 658
1.2% 1.1%
441 700
0.9% 1.2%
2633 2613
5.5% 4.5%
3240 4911
6.7% 8.5%
3057 3542
6.3% 6.1%
8292 57705
00.0% 100.0%
--
1972
1407
1.6%
9720
10.8%
762
0.8%
444
0.5%
1624
1.8%
3132
3.5%
10787
12.0%
2754
3.1%
2644
2.9%
15510
17.3%
2122
2.4%
6135
6.8%
312
0.3%
219
0.2%
12797
14.2%
1041
1.2%
1015
1.1%
4256
4.7%
8275
9.2%
4935
5.5%
89891
100.0%
1977
2043
1.3%
18331
12.0%
1276
0.8%
660
0.4%
2824
1.8%
7218
4.7%
16110
10.5%
5650
3.7%
3552
2.3%
23981
15.7%
3001
2.0%
10342
6.8%
519
0.3%
833
0.5%
23354
15.3%
2310
1.5%
627
0.4%
5884
3.9%
15191
9.9%
9013
5.9%
152719
100.0%
Table 3.10 Intermediate
Table 3.11 Aggregated
(Japan)
Building Construction
Intermediate Input Structure
(including M&R Construction)
SECTOR YEAR 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
(M)Material 722.2 1323.6 2996.7 4744.2 6887.7
52.8% 46.7% 42.5% 36.9% 34.3%
(P)Product 220.5 578.7 1658.7 3252.3 5386.3
16.1% 20.4% 23.5% 25.3% 26.8%
Machinery 128.6 236.2 532.3 947.8 1289.0
9.4% 8.3% 7.5% 7.4% 6.4%
Electric power supply 2.0 11.9 27.4 94.9 171.8
0.1% 0.4% 0.4% 0.7% 0.9%
Trade&Transportation 167.1 448.2 1029.6 2463.2 3728.7
12.2% 15.8% 14.6% 19.1% 18.6%
Finance & Insurance 16.5 48.1 113.6 299.6 370.3
1.2% 1.7% 1.6% 2.3% 1.8%
Service 11.6 30.8 227.9 492.8 1040.3
0.8% 1.1% 3.2% 3.8% 5.2%
Other 100.2 156.9 472.4 571.1 1212.4
7.3% 5.5% 6.7% 4.4% 6.0%
TOTAL INTERMED. INPUT 1368.6 2834.4 7058.7 12865.9 20086.4
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N.B.
Material is the sum of the items with (M) in Table 3.9
Product is the sum of the items with (P) in Table 3.9
Source: Economic Statistics Annual
Compiled by the author
Table 3.11 Aggregated Intermediate Input Structure
(Japan Cont'd)
Heavy Construction
SECTOR YEAR 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
(M)Material 310.1 564.9 1258.7 2895.3 5143.3
38.4% 42.3% 41.2% 45.3% 43.5%
(P)Product 111.7 156.1 355.1 686.1 1174.4
13.8% 11.7% 11.6% 10.7% 9.9%
Machinery 159.9 239.7 526.2 385.1 1799.2
19.8% 18.0% 17.2% 6.0% 15.2%
Electric power supply 2.8 11.5 20.8 80.6 165.9
0.3% 0.9% 0.7% 1.3% 1.4%
Trade&Transportation 100.8 206.2 439.3 1142.8 1855.4
12.5% 15.5% 14.4% 17.9% 15.7%
Finance & Insurance 10.8 30.1 67.7 181.3 254.6
1.3% 2.3% 2.2% 2.8% 2.2%
Service 7.9 20.0 80.6 231.8 786.6
1.0% - 1.5% 2.6% 3.6% 6.7%
Other 104.0 105.5 307.3 782.4 642.9
12.9% 7.9% 10.1% 12.3% 5.4%
TOTAL INTERM. INPUT 808.0 1334.0 3055.8 6385.2 11822.2
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N.B.
Material is the sum of the items with (M) in Table 3.9
Product is the sum of the items with (P) in Table 3.9
Source: Economic Statistics Annual
Compiled by the author
Table 3.11 Aggregated Intermediate Input Structure
(Japan Cont'd)
Total Construction
SECTOR YEAR 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
(M)Material 1032.2 1888.5 4255.3 7639.5 12031.0
47.4% 45.3% 42.1% 39.7% 37.7%
(P)Product 332.2 734.8 2013.8 3938.4 6560.7
15.3% 17.6% 19.9% 20.5% 20.6%
Machinery 288.4 475.9 1058.5 1332.8 3088.2
13.3% 11.4% 10.5% 6.9% 9.7%
Electric power supply 4.8 23.4 48.2 175.5 337.8
0.2% 0.6% 0.5% 0.9% 1.1%
Trade & Transp. 267.9 654.4 1469.0 3606.0 5584.0
12.3% 15.7% 14.5% 18.7% 17.5%
Finance & Insurance 27.3 78.2 181.3 480.9 624.8
1.3% 1.9% 1.8% 2.5% 2.0%
Service 19.6 50.8 308.5 724.5 1826.9
0.9% 1.2% 3.1% 3.8% 5.7%
Other 204.3 262.5 779.8 1353.5 1855.2
9.4% 6.3% 7.7% 7.0% 5.8%
TOTAL INTERMED. INPUT 2176.6 4168.4 10114.4 19251.1 31908.6
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N.B.
Material is the sum of the items with (M) in Table 3.10
Product is the sum of the items with (P) in Table 3.10
Source: economic Statistics Annual
Compiled by the author
Table 3.12 Aggregated Intermediate Input Structure (U.S.A.)
New Construction
SECTOR YEAR 1958 1963 1967 1972 1977
(M)Material 14841 17000 27110 43884
37.4% 37.4% 35.4% 36.3% 37.6%
(P)Product 7861 10054 14856 18739
17.1% 19.8% 20.9% 19.9% 16.0%
Machinery 3129 3774 5944 9763
8.8% 7.9% 7.9% 8.0% 8.4%
Utilities 205 64 154 603
0.4% 0.5% 0.1% 0.2% 0.5%
Trade & Transportation 7596 8638 13387 21441
20.0% 19.2% 18.0% 17.9% 18.4%
Finance & Insurance 401 572 748 1843
1.3% 1.0% 1.2% 1.0% 1.6%
Service 2959 4382 7669 14161
7.6% 7.5% 9.1% 10.3% 12.1%
Other 2637 3549 4745 6390
6.8% 6.7% 7.4% 6.4% 5.5%
TOTAL INTERMED. INPUT 39629 48033 74613 116824
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N.B.
Material is the sum of the items with (M) in table 3.10.
Product is the sum of the items with (P) in table 3.10.
Source: Survey of Current Business
Compiled by the author
Table 3.12 Aggregated Intermediate Input Structure
(U.S.A. Cont'd)
Maintenance & Repair Construction
SECTOR YEAR 1958 1963 1967 1972 1977
(M)Material 3371 3369 5402 12504
45.6% 38.9% 34.8% 35.4% 34.8%
(P)Product 919 1805 1728 7037
14.5% 10.6% 18.7% 11.3% 19.6%
Machinery 770 980 2313 3580
5.5% 8.9% 10.1% 15.1% 10.0%
Utilities 90 9 65 230
0.4% 1.0% 0.1% 0.4% 0.6%
Trade & Transportation 2210 2201 3666 7797
25.6% 25.5% 22.8% 24.0% 21.7%
Finance & Insurance 161 86 293 467
0.8% 1.9% 0.9% 1.9% 1.3%
Service 281 529 606 1030
0.9% 3.2% 5.5% 4.0% 2.9%
Other 861 693 1205 3250
6.3% 9.9% 7.2% 7.9% 9.1%
TOTAL INTERMED. INPUT 8663 9672 15278 35895
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N.B.
Material is the sum of the items with (M) in table 3.10.
Product is the sum of the items with (P) in table 3.10.
Source: Survey of Current Business
Compiled by the author
Table 3.12 Aggregated Intermediate Input Structure
(U.S.A. Cont'd)
Total Construction
SECTOR YEAR 1958 1963 1967 1972 1977
(M)Material 18212 20369 32512 56388
39.0% 37.7% 35.3% 36.2% 36.9%
(P)Product 8780 11859 16584 25776
16.6% 18.2% 20.6% 18.4% 16.9%
Machinery 3899 4754 8257 13343
8.2% 8.1% 8.2% 9.2% 8.7%
Elec. pow. supply 295 73 219 833
0.4% 0.6% 0.1% 0.2% 0.5%
Trade & Transportation 9806 10839 17053 29238
21.1% 20.3% 18.8% 19.0% 19.1%
Finance & Insurance 562 658 1041 2310
1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.2% 1.5%
Service 3240 4911 8275 15191
6.2% 6.7% 8.5% 9.2% 9.9%
Other 3498 4242 5950 9640
6.7% 7.2% 7.4% 6.6% 6.3%
TOTAL INTERED. INPUT 48292 57705 89891 152719
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
N.B.
Material is the sum of the items with (M) in table 3.10.
Product is the sum of the items with (P) in table 3.10.
Source: Survey of Current Business
Compiled by the author
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CHAPTER 4 STRUCTURE OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
4.1 Introduction.
The next two chapters discuss the structure of the
construction industry and the large size general contractors
in particular. As it focuses each construction
establishment, numbers given in these chapters may be
inconsistent with the numbers given in the former two
chapters due to double counting of subcontracting, exclusion
of force account, inclusion of M&R construction and
inclusion of service which is classified as service sector
in the former two chapters.
Chapter four discusses construction establishments in
general, while chapter five focuses large size construction
establishments and leading contractors in Japan.
4.2.1 Construction Establishment in Japan.
In Japan, the number of registered construction firms
including proprietorship counted a record high of 516,000 in
1984 of which 440,329 are primarily in the construction
industry. The rest are such companies as trading companies
and ship builders whose primary business are outside
construction industry. The number of firms has increased
constantly since 1970 when it was 163,000. [Construction
White paper, 1985] The number of workers employed in the
construction industry has increased from 3,940,000 to
5,410,000 during this period. Their percentage share in the
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total non-agricultural work forces has also increased from
8.9 percent in 1965 to 11.0 percent in 1980 and has stayed
relatively constant thereafter.
As the number of construction firms increases, the
average number of workers per establishment has decreased
from 24 in 1970 to 10 in 1980. Among the 5,410,000 workers,
by type of employment 70 percent are regular workers, 13
percent are proprietorship and the rest are temporarily
workers. By type of firms, 70 percent of total workers work
for corporations and 30 percent work for proprietorships.
[Kensetsu Toukei Youran, 1985]
4.2.2 Construction Establishment in the U.S.
In the U.S., the number of establishments is 1,389,000
including proprietorship in 1982. The number of construction
workers has increased from 3,230,000 in 1965 to 4,661,000 in
1985. However, their percentage in total nonagricultural
work forces has fluctuated between 4.4 percent and 5.3
percent during the last two decades. The average number of
workers of an establishment is 3.1, which is still smaller
than that of Japan. The dominance of small size firms in
the U.S. construction industry is mainly due to residential
oriented U.S. construction market structure and small size
of special trading contractors. According to Mathieu and
Rubinstein, "Three-quarters of all employees for single home
contractors worked for establishment with 1 to 4 employees.
Over three-fourth of the non employee firms were special
trading contractors, i.e. those engaged in activities such
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as plumbing, heating, air-conditioning and electrical work."
The greater volume of the M&R construction, which accounts
for almost 20 percent of total construction, also
contributes this relative small size of establishments.
According to 1982 census, almost 30 percent of construction
performed by special trade contractors, which accounts more
than three-quarters of proprietorship, is M&R construction.
[1982 Census of Construction Industries, 1984]
4.3 Size of Construction Establishments
The top 113 Japanese construction firms in Japan whose
capital is over 1 billion yen, which is 0.025 percent of
total establishments, employ 274,000 employees and their
value of completion is 11,800,000 million yen of original
contracts. The number of employees is about 5.1 percent of
total construction workers and their value of completion is
more than 25 percent of total original construct. The
second largest 842 Japanese construction firms whose capital
is between 0.1 and 1 billion yen, which is 0.19 percent in
numbers, employ 225,000 workers and their value of
completion is 5,288 million yen. Their employees' number is
4.2 percent of total construction workers and the value of
completion is 11.2 percent of the total.
In the U.S., the size of establishment is categorized
by the number of employees rather than the size of capital.
The largest 121 construction firms, accounting for 0.009
percent of total establishment, employ 6.7 percent of total
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workers and receive 8 percent of total business receipts.
The second largest 234 construction firms account for 0.017
percent of total establishments and employ 2.9 percent of
total workers and receive 4.6 percent of total business
receipts. Establishments without employees account for 67
percent of total establishment and 17 percent of total
workers, while receiving 11 percent of total business
receipts.
Both in Japan and in the U.S., small establishments
seem to dominate the construction industry. The construction
establishments of the smallest category account for almost
60 percent in both countries. In the U.S., these
establishments are businesses without employees, while in
Japanese establishments have 5.6 employees on average.
Therefore, dominance of the small establishments is more
clearly observed in the U.S.. In addition to the
differences in market structure, there seems to be two more
reasons for it. The first reason is the preference of
independence in the U.S. According to Mathieu and
Rubinstein, "..the viability of the small construction firms
may be a strong desire for the independence on the part of
skilled construction workers." [Construction Review,
Sept/Oct 1985]. The other reason is the legal requirement
for Japanese construction establishments. Since 1972,
construction firms in Japan have been required to have
permission from the Minister of Construction or local
governors depending on their size of operation by
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"Kensetsugyo-ho" (Construction Contractors Low). In order
to protect owners from troubles associated with unreliable
contractors (i.e., bankruptcy). It even requires proprietors
to meet certain requirement such as experience, financial
status and capability of management to bid jobs. As a
result, such proprietors as typically found in the United
States hardly can find their way in the construction
industry in Japan.
4.4 Economies of Scale
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show cumulative percentages of
construction workers and business receipts added from the
smaller establishments. In these figures, the X axis shows
the cumulative percentage of establishment and the Y axis
shows the cumulative percentages of both employment and
business receipt. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the upper three
percent of these figures to give clearer views of large size
establishments. If all establishments have the same
employment and the same business receipts, a diagonal
linear line represents both employment and receipts.
In the U.S., employment shows an exponential line
while it is more linear in Japan. These line shows that
size of establishment ranges more widely in the U.S..
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Figure 4.1 Cumulative Employment and Value of Completion
(Japan, 1981)
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Figure 4.2 Cumulative Emoloyment and
(U.S.A., 1982)
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Figure 4.3 Cumulative Employment and Value of Completion
(Japan, Detail of Upper 3%, 1981)
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Figure 4.4 Cumulative Employment and value of Completion
(U.S.A., Detail of Upper 3%, 1982)
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The lines of values of completion make similar
exponential lines in both of the two countries. However, in
Japan this line lies far below the employment line while it
is very close to the line of employment in the U.S..
These lines show that, in the U.S., the size of
construction establishments, in terms of business receipt,
is proportional to the number of workers. In Japan,
however, value of completion is not proportional to the
number of workers; i.e. establishments with greater number
of employee have greater value of completion per worker. In
other words, the productivity of worker is relatively
constant in the U.S. while, in Japan, a larger
establishment has a greater productivity. Particularly, as
shown in figures 4.3 and 4.4, construction firms of the
largest category in Japan have an exceptionally high value
of completion compared with their employment.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the volume of completion or
business receipts per worker. In these figures, the X axis
represents the common logarithm of the number of worker. It
makes a steep, continuous increasing line in Japan whereas
it is relatively flat and more importantly, decreases at the
largest size in the U.S.. This high productivity of large
size firms in Japan is attained by their capital intensity
as well as peculiar labor subcontracting systems which are
discussed later.
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Figure 4.5 Value of Completion per Worker (Japan, 1981)
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Figure 4.6 Value of Completion per Worker (U.S.A., 1982)
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4.5 Construction Establishment with Payroll
Tables 4.1 to 4.4 in appendix three at the end of this
chapter give more detailed statistics for construction
establishments with payrolls in the U.S. and construction
corporations in Japan. Net business receipts, which are
the total business receipts or values of completion net
payment to subcontractors, shows the same tendency as total
business receipts. (row H) The row below the net business
receipt per employee (row H) shows the index of worker
productivity, assuming that net receipt per employee for the
second smallest category is 100. Establishments of these
categories are chosen as the criteria because they have
similar average employee numbers of 6.9 and 6.5 in the U.S.
and Japan respectively.
It shows that the largest construction firms have the
highest worker productivity of 214.2 in Japan, while that
of the United states is only 123.0, which is smaller than
that of construction establishment with 20 to 49 employee.
It is difficult to compare these numbers between the
two countries on the same scale because of fluctuating
exchange rates and different structures of the industry.
Assuming a foreign exchange rate of 200 yen to the dollar,
the worker productivity is higher for every class of
construction firms in Japan. Moreover, that of the largest
construction firms is almost three times as much as that of
the U.S..
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The rows (I) through (M) in these tables show the cost
structure of construction establishments. One
characteristic about Japanese construction industry is that
it include labor as a separate cost item. The
characteristics are as follows:
1) These laborers come from other firms or proprietors.
2) Laborers are paid by working hours or days
rather than the tasks they perform.
4) Laborers are usually directly controlled by
the original contractors.
From the point of organization, this labor can be considered
as a form of subcontracting, because they are hired only
when needed. However, from the point of their tasks, they
are very close to the lower level employees of the original
contractor because they are controlled by their managers or
superintendents, and they are paid not by the specific tasks
of the project. This system may come from the Japanese
tradition of using temporary construction workers who were
primarily involved in agriculture and did not form organized
work forces. Regardless of the history, it makes original
contractors flexible to the business fluctuations by cutting
the cost of keeping unnecessary payrolls during economic
through.
The sum of the cost of labor and other expenses at the
site, which mainly consist of the payrolls of the employees
at site, gives almost the compatible number to the cost of
payroll in the United States. It might have inflated the
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aforementioned productivity of the Japanese construction
worker by understating the number of employees.
Payment to subcontractors on the whole is higher for
Japanese construction firms (row J in tables 4.1 to 4.4).
It accounts for almost 40 percent for establishments in
Japan and 25 percent for the U.S. firms. Besides, as
Japanese construction firms pay an additional 10 percent for
the aforementioned labor cost, they pay out almost 50
percent of value of completion back to the construction
industry. This fact reflects a strong intra-industry
dependency. The largest establishments in Japan pay 55.5
percent into construction industry, whereas the largest
establishments in the United States pay only 23.3 percent
back into construction industry.
This high degree of intra-industry dependency of the
construction industry in Japan promotes construction firms
to form hierarchical structures. In this hierarchical
structure, it is not unusual that a part of the original
contract is subcontracted several times, from the original
contractor to the primary subcontractor and from the primary
subcontractor to the secondary subcontractor and so on,
until it is actually performed. According to Terasawa, such
cases are typically observed in the labor intensive
subcontracts such as carpentry [Terasawa, 1985, pp.41].
This relationship between contractors is not an ad-hoc
one. Large size contractors usually have a group of
subcontractors and keep a continuous relationship. The
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number of this group is reported to be 4839 in 1984, while
the number of member companies of large size contractors is
usually 300 to 700. [Nakamura, 1985]
By organizing such groups, large size original
contractors can maintain the quality of tasks performed by
subcontractors and the subcontractors can receive certain
amounts of contract regardless of business fluctuations.
Also subcontractors have other benefits, such as training
programs offered by original contractors. However, there is
also a strong counter argument against this system; large
contractors force smaller subcontractors to accept
unfavorable contract condition such as late payment.
[Terasawa, 1980]
4.6 Capital Intensity of Construction Firms
As discussed in chapter three, capital intensity is a
index showing the degree of industrialization. Row (P) of
tables 4.1 and 4.2 shows depreciable assets of construction
firms which include buildings, construction machinery and
equipment.
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show depreciable assets per
employee in the same way as figures 4.5 and 4.6. As the
number of employees increases, depreciable assets per
employee also increases in Japan, whereas in the U.S., it
peaks at the middle. Assuming the exchange rate of 200 yen
to one dollar, the firms in the largest category has more
than twice as much assets in Japan as they do in the U.S..
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Table 4.7 Depreciable Assets per Employee (Japan, 1981)
(Million yen)
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Table 4.8 Depreciable Assets per Employee (U.S.A., 1982)
(Thousand dollar)
30
28-
26-
24-
22-
20-
18-
16-
14-
12-
10-
8-
86-
4
2-
0 2
log(Ave. # of Employee)
Source: 1982 Census of Construction Industries, 1985
r] 1 0 0 00
D
0 0
on0
o0
- ~ Iu
88
Besides their capital intensity, Japanese construction
firms have a greater capital utilization rate or
productivity of capital, which is given by net value of
completion divided by depreciable assets, regardless of the
size of the firms (row R in tables 4.1 to 4.4). It is
almost six for the majority of firms in Japan. In the U.S.,
although it is almost six for large size firms, it is three
to four for small size firms. This indicates these capital
assets are not effectively utilized in the smaller firms.
Thus, productivity of capital is relatively high and
constant in Japan, whereas their U.S. counterparts
(particularly in small size firms), have low productivity of
capital. High and constant productivity of capital in Japan
might be achieved through the hierarchical structure of
construction industry by eliminating redundant investment
and utilizing capital assets more efficiently through
coordination among various size of firms.
4.7 Summary of Chapter Four
1. The size of construction firms ranges more widely
in the U.S.
2. Productivity of worker (value of completion
divided by number of worker) does not vary much
depending on the size of construction firms in the
U.S. compared with that in Japan.
3. Productivity of worker increases as the size of the
firm increases in Japan.
4. Construction firms in the largest category have
exceptionally high productivity of workers in Japan.
5. Labor subcontracting system in Japan might affect
this high productivity of worker.
6. Construction firms in Japan subcontract a greater
amount of original contracts that result in higher
intra-industry dependency.
7. Firms in the largest category have the greatest
capital intensity in Japan and least capital
intensity in the U.S..
8. Construction firms in Japan have a relatively
constant capital utilization rate (or productivity
of capital) compared with the U.S..
9. Construction firms in the smaller category have
low productivity of capital in the U.S..
Table 4.1 Construction Establishment by Size of Capital
(Japan, 1981)
(Million yen)
Size of Capital 0-1.99 2-4.99 5-9.99 10-49
(A) Number of 47210
Establishment 23.870%
(B) Number of Employee 264376
(A)*(C) 10.4%
(C) Employee/Establishment 5.6
(D) Val. of Completion
(M.YEN)
(E) Val.Compltn./Emply
(F) Net Val of Compltn
(E)-(J) (M.YEN)
(G) Net/Total Val. Com
(F)/(D)
(H) Net Recpt/Employee
13262=100
Cost per establishment
(I) Material&Component
(J) Pymt to Subcontract
(K) Labor
(L) Other Exp. at Site
(N) COST SUB TOTAL
(X) Other Expenses
(0) Operation Surplus
(D)/(A)-(N)-(X)
(P) Depreciable Assets
(Q) D.A./Employee
(R) Productivity of D.A.
{(F)/(A) 1/(P)
4418526
5.9%
16713
2976118
6.7%
67.4%
11257
84.9
( % of Value
25091
26.8%
30553
32.6%
10446
11.2%
8458
9.0%
74548
79.7%
17327
18.5%
1718
1.8%
10687
1908
5.88
74667
37.753%
515202
20.3%
6.9
9994701
13.3%
19400
6831881
15.4%
68.4%
13261
100.0
41459
20.963%
439465
17.3%
10.6
9978933
13.3%
22707
6381038
14.4%
63.9%
14520
109.5
of Completion)
35771 65173
26.7% 27.1%
42359 86782
31.6% 36.1%
15062 24360
11.3% 10.1%
15653 23210
11.7% 9.6%
108845 199525
81.3% 82.9%
21748
16.2%
3264
2.4%
15001
2174
6.10
32015
13.3%
9154
3.8%
24341
2296
6.33
32085
16.223%
715496
28.2%
22.3
23676388
31.6%
33091
14166875
31.9%
59.8%
19800
149.3
176260
23.9%
296385
40.2%
72911
9.9%
84241
11.4%
629797
85.3%
75079
10.2%
33051
4.5%
72936
3271
6.06
Source: Kensetsu Toukei Youran. 1985
Compiled by the Author
Note: Unit in 1000 yen except for rows (D) and (F)
Table 4.1 Construction Establishment by Size of Capital
(Japan, 1981, Cont'd)
(Million yen)
Size of Capital 50-99 100-999 1000-
(A) Number of 1400
Establishment 0.708%
(B) Number of Employee 106120
(A)*(C) 4.2%
(C) Employee/Establishment 75.8
(D) Val. of Completion
(M.YEN)
(E) Val.Compltn./Emply
(F) Net Val of Compltn
(E)-(J) (M.YEN)
(G) Net/Total Val. Com
(F)/(D)
(H) Net Recpt/Employee
13262=100
Cost per establishment
(I) Material&Component
(J) Pymt to Subcontract
(K) Labor
(L) Other Exp. at Site
(N) COST SUB TOTAL
(X) Other Expenses
(0) Operation Surplus
(D)/(A)-(N)-(X)
(P) Depreciable Assets
(Q) D.A./Employee
(R) Productivity of D.A.
f(F)/(A)1/(P)
3813111
5.1%
35932
1979520
4.5%
51.9%
18654
140.7
842
0.426%
224898
8.9%
267.1
8191378
10.9%
36423
4328409
9.7%
52.8%
19246
145.1
113
0.057%
274409
10.8%
2428.4
14874021
19.8%
54204
7795884
17.5%
52.4%
28410
214.2
( % of Value of Completion)
547226 1793333 24556593
20.1% 18.4% 18.7%
1309708 4587850 62638384
48.1% 47.2% 47.6%
195422 608296 10339942
7.2% 6.3% 7.9%
284710 1180131 16407430
10.5% 12.1% 12.5%
2337066 8169610 113942349
85.8% 84.0% 86.6%
224999
8.3%
161586
5.9%
208417
2750
6.80
731963
7.5%
8749535
6.6%
826905 8936621
8.5%
738505
2765
6.94
6.8%
11221561
4621
6.13
Source: Kensetsu Toukei Youran. 1985
Compiled by the Author
Note: Unit in 1000 yen except for rows (D) and (F)
Table 4.2 Construction Establishment by Size of Employment
(U.S.A., 1982)
Number of Employee 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99
(A) Number of
Establishment
(B) Number of
All Employee
(C) Employee/Estblsmt.
(A)/(B)
(D) All Busns. Receipt
(E) Busns.Rcpt/Employee
(D)/(B)
(F) Net Recpt
(E)-(J)
(G) Net/Bsnes Recpt
(F)/(D)
(H) Net Recpt/Employee
44.8=100
284825 85449
62.366% 18.710%
566895 559039
13.3% 13.1%
1.99 6.54
30713
9.5%
54.2
24397
10.5%
79.4%
43.0
96.0
Cost of Total Receipt ( % of
(I) Material&Component 10871
(I)/(E) 35.4
(J) Pymt. to Subcon. 5330
(J)/(E) 17.4
(K) Rent (Machinery) 329
(K)/(E) 1.1
(L) CapitalExpenditure 559
(L)/(E) 1.8
(M) Payroll 5906
(M)/(E) 19.2
(N) COST SUB TOTAL 22996
74.9
(0) Operation Surplus 7718
(D)-(N) 25.1
(P) Depreciable Assets 7325
(Q) D.A./Employee 12.9
(R) Productivity of D.A. 3.33
f(F)/(A) /(P)
31655
9.8%
56.6
25058
10.7%
79.2%
44.8
100.0
47954 27207
10.500% 5.957%
641525 810300
15.0% 19.0%
13.38 29.78
41608 63174
12.8% 19.5%
64.9 78.0
31899 45734
13.7% 19.6%
76.7% 72.4%
49.7 56.4
110.9 125.9
total Receipt)
10783 13357
% 34.1% 32.1%
5532 8360
% 17.5% 20.1%
429 590
% 1.4% 1.4%
596 730
% 1.9% 1.8%
7598 10427
% 24.0% 25.1%
24939 33464
% 78.8% 80.4%
19053
30.2%
15337
24.3%
910
1.4%
1041
1.6%
15339
24.3%
51679
81.8%
7090
1.552%
482731
11.3%
68.09
44255
13.6%
91.7
30776
13.2%
69.5%
63.8
142.2
12409
28.0%
11941
27.0%
700
1.6%
762
1.7%
10376
23.4%
36188
81.8%
6716 8145 11495 8067
% 21.2% 19.6% 18.2% 18.2%
6779
12.1
3.69
8003
12.5
3.98
10980
13.6
4.17
7159
14.8
4.29
Source: 1982 Census of Construction Industries, 1984
Compiled by the Author
N.B. <---- Data are included in the left column
Unit: million dollar except for per employee data which
are expressed in 1000 $
Table 4.2 Construction Establishment by Size of Employment
(U.S.A., 1982, Cont'd)
Number of Employee 100-249 250-499 500-999 1000-
(A) Number of
Establishment
3126
0.684%
(B) Number of 462999
All Employee 10.8%
(C) Employee/Estblsmt. 148.11
(A)/(B)
(D) All Busns. Receipt 43526
(E) Busns.Rcpt/Employee
(D)/(B)
(F) Net Recpt
(E)-(J)
(G) Net/Bsnes Recpt
(F)/(D)
(H) Net Recpt/Employee
44.8=100
Cost of Total Receipt (
(I) Material&Component
(I)/(E)
(J) Pymt. to Subcon.
(J)/(E)
(K) Rent (Machinery)
(K)/(E)
(L) CapitalExpenditure
(L)/(E)
(M) Payroll
(M)/(E)
(N) COST SUB TOTAL
(0) Operation Surplus
(D)-(N)
13.4%
94.0
29265
12.5%
67.2%
694
0.152%
232220
5.4%
334.61
2E+07
7.3%
101.4
15318
6.6%
65.1%
234 121
0.051% 0.026%
157945 361415
3.7% 8.5%
674.98 2986.90
2E+07
5.2%
107.1
10893
4.7%
64.4%
63.2 66.0
141.0 147.2
% of total Receipt)
11886
27.3%
12839
29.5%
701
1.6%
761
1.7%
10376
23.8%
36563
84.0%
10505
26.0%
7261
30.8%
338
1.4%
390
1.7%
5374
22.8%
33359
0.1%
6963 7091
16.0% 17.5%
3E+07
9.0%
80.6
19928
8.5%
68.4%
69.0 55.1
153.9 123.0
7492
25.7%
6909
23.7%
324
1.1%
227
0.8%
9526
32.7%
24479
0.1%
4651
16.0%
<-----
<-----
5402
31.9%
189
1.1%
157
0.9%
3744
22.1%
<-----
<-----
Depreciable Assets 7449
D.A./Employee 16.1
Productivity of D.A. 3.92
{(F)/(A)-]/(P)
Source: 1982 Census of Construction Industries, 1984
Compiled by the Author
N.B. <---- Data are included in the left column
Unit: million dollar except for per employee data which
are expressed in 1000 dollar
(P)
(Q)
(R)
4096
17.6
3.75
1687
10.7
6.45
3265
9.0
6.10
I 
I I I m I I
Table 4.3 Construction Establishment by Type of Activity
(Japan, 1981)
Type of Activity GENERAL BUILDING HEAVY
(A) Number of Estab. 15485 129120 67975
2.8% 23.4% 12.3%
(B) All Employee 564755 1009813 1262194
11.4% 20.3% 25.4%
Data below are based on sample of 2603 establishment and
may have some inconsistency with numbers shown other part
in this thesis. Numbers below are average of sample firms
in the category.
(C) Employee/Establish 14.5 10.6 15.5
(D) Ttl Const. Receipt 749189 460883 473458
(E) Const.Rcpt/Employee 51668 43480 30546
(D)/(C)
(F) Net Recpt 401052 218806 307922
(E)-(J)
(G) Net/Total Const.Re 53.5% 47.5% 65.0%
(F)/(D)
(H) Net Recpt/Employee 27659 20642 19866
(F)/(C)
Cost of Construction ( % of Total Cost)
(I) Material&Component 168726 79435 106531
22.5% 17.2% 22.5%
(J) Pymt to Subcontract 348137 242077 165536
46.5% 52.5% 35.0%
(K) Labor 56279 42777 50818
7.5% 9.3% 10.7%
(L) Other Exp. at Site 78819 30169 84008
10.5% 6.5% 17.7%
(M) Cost Sub Total 651961 394458 406893
87.0% 85.6% 85.9%
(X) Other Expenses 59794 42146 45178
8.0% 9.1% 9.5%
(0) Op. Surplus 37434 24279 21387
(F)/(A)-(N)-(X) 5.0% 5.3% 4.5%
(P) Depreciable Assets 54359 28311 79390
(Q) D.A./Employee 3749 2671 5122
(R) Productivity of D.A. 7.38 7.73 3.88
(F)/(P)
Source: Kensetsu Toukei Youran, 1985
Compiled by the Author
Note: Unit 1000 yen.
Table 4.3 Construction Establishment by Type of Activity
(Japan, 1981, Cont'd)
Type of Activity P.A.E. OTHER TOTAL
(A) Number of Estab. 105218 233000 550798
19.1% 42.3% 100.0%
(B) All Employee 1032203 1100198 4969163
20.8% 22.1% 100.0%
Data below are based on sample of 2603 establishment and
may have some inconsistency with numbers shown other part
in this thesis. Numbers below are average of sample firms
in the category.
(C) Employee/Establish 16.0 12.0 14.50
(D) Ttl Const. Receipt 320888 299379 454160
(E) Const.Rcpt/Employee 20056 24948 31321
(D)/(C)
(F) Net Recpt 207658 208571 265720
(E)-(J)
(G) Net/Total Const.Re 64.7% 69.7% 58.5%
(F)/(D)
(H) Net Recpt/Employee 12979 17381 18326
(F)/(C)
Cost of Construction ( % of Total Cost)
(I) Material&Component 86866 88150 102819
27.1% 29.4% 22.6%
(J) Pymt to Subcontract 113230 90808 188440
35.3% 30.3% 41.5%
(K) Labor 25029 28342 41296
7.8% 9.5% 9.1%
(L) Other Exp. at Site 39395 28589 51690
12.3% 9.5% 11.4%
(N) Cost Sub Total 264520 235889 384245
82.4% 78.8% 84.6%
(X) Other Expenses 42335 44428 46718
13.2% 14.8% 10.3%
(0) Op. Surplus 14033 19062 23197
(F)/(A)-(N)-(X) 4.4% 6.4% 5.1%
(P) Depreciable Assets 26728 31076 42775
(Q) D.A./Employee 1671 2590 2950
(R) Productivity of D.A. 7.77 6.71 6.21
(F)/(P)
Source: Kensetsu Toukei Youran, 1985
Compiled by the Author
Note: Unit 1000 yen
P.A.E.: Plumbing, Air conditioning and Electric
OTHER: Other trade contractors
Table 4.4 Construction Establishment by Kind of Activity
(U.S.A., 1982)
Kind of Activity BUILDING HEAVY SP.TRADE TOTAL
(A) Number of
Establishment
(B) Number of Employee
123180
27.3%
993629
23.5%
(C) Employee/Establish 8.07
(A)/(B)
(D) Ttl Const. Recpt. 113239222
36.5%
New Const. 1
M & R Const.
(E) Const.Rcpt/Employee
(E)/(B)
(F) Net Recpt
(G) Net/Total Const.Re
(F)/(D)
(H) Net Recpt/Employee
(F)/(B)
Cost of Construction (
(I) Material&Component
(J) Pymt to Subcont.
(K) Rent (Machinery)
(L) CapitalExpenditure
(M) Payroll
(N) Cost Subtotal 1
(0) Op. Surplus
(D)-(N)
06416462
93.97%
6822760
6.03%
114.0
57367100
24.7%
50.7%
57.7
% of Total
25590334
22.6%
55872122
49.3%
864386
0.8%
1258359
1.1%
17048609
15.1%
00633810
88.9%
12605412
11.1%
Depreciable Assets 12122106
D.A./Employee
Productivity of D.A.
12.200
4.74
28187
6.3%
852065
20.1%
30.23
299408
66.4%
2389193
56.4%
7.98
450775
100.0%
4234887
100.0%
9.39
67271540 129657840 310168602
21.7% 41.8% 100.0%
55093913 92753723 254264098
81.90% 71.54% 81.98%
12177627 36904117 55904504
18.10% 28.46% 18.02%
79.0 54.3 73.2
54653951 119983838 232004889
23.6%
81.2%
64.1
Cost)
22345976
33.2%
12617589
18.8%
1728453
51.7%
92.5%
50.2
100.0%
74.8%
54.8
47991940 95928250
37.0% 30.9%
9674001 78163712
7.5% 25.2%
1901484 4494323
2.6% 1.5% 1.4%
1645372 2247879 5151610
2.4% 1.7% 1.7%
19443725 41604663 78096997
28.9% 32.1% 25.2%
57781115 103419967 261834892
85.9% 79.8% 84.4%
9490425 26237873 48333710
14.1% 20.2% 15.6%
20028868 23377673 55528648
23.506 9.785 13.112
2.73 5.13 4.18
(F)/(P)
Source: 1982 Census of Construction Industries, 1984
Compiled by the Author
Note: Unit: Million dollar except for per employee data
which is expressed in 1000 dollar.
(P)
(Q)
(R)
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CHAPTER 5 BIG FIVE GENERAL CONTRACTORS IN JAPAN
5.1 Introduction
As described in chapter four, large size construction
establishments in Japan are not only big in size but also
have many characteristics, such as capital intensity and
hierarchical subcontracting structure in the industry.
These large size general contractors, the big five
contractors in particular, play essential roles in Japanese
construction industry. In this chapter, these big five
general contractors are discussed.
The first part of this chapter discusses their role in
the industry and inter-industry. The second part of this
chapter discusses some of the characteristics of these
contractors, which are as follow: 1) Design capabilities,
2) Safety control, 3) Research and development
capabilities, and 4) Quality control programs.
5.2 Historical Backgrounds
The big five general contractors have always lead the
construction industry in Japan even prior to World War II.
According to Nakamura [1985], the top five construction
firms in 1944 in order of size were Shimizu-gumi, Ohbayashi-
Gumi, Takenaka-koumuten, Okura-doboku (currently known as
Taisei-kensetsu) and Kajima-gumi. All these firms still
remain as the big five contractors today. It is interesting
to note that all the top 10 construction firms at that time
still remain in the construction industry and have kept
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their same prestigious positions. Thus, the big general
contractors have established stable positions in the
industry. This stability of the big general contractors
indicates high entrance and exit barriers of the industry.
It contrasts clearly with small size construction
establishments, which typically have low entrance and exit
barriers.
The one exceptional movement in Japanese construction
industry is Kumagai-gumi, which has increased its share with
a relatively aggressive policy and has caught up to the big
five contractors. However, it should be recognized that
Kumagai-gumi used to be one of the top ten contractors in
1944. Also it must be noted that it increased its share
mainly through overseas construction projects, indicating
the difficulty of increasing share in the domestic market.
5.3 Share in the Domestic Market
Their share in the total domestic construction market
is shown in figure 5.1. The total share of the big five
(Kajima-kensetsu, Taisei-kensetsu, Shimizu-kensetsu
Ohbayashi-gumi and Takenaka-koumuten) plus one (Kumagai
gumi) contractors has fluctuated between 7.55 percent and
9.17 percent during the last ten years. This fluctuation of
their share in the construction market seems to come from
the phase difference of construction investment due to the
magnitude of the project they are involved. Figure 5.2
shows the percent increase of the value of construction from
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previous years of the big five plus one general contractors
and total construction investment, indicating a topological
difference.
By type of construction, they construct both buildings
and heavy construction except for Takenaka-koumuten which
specializes in building construction and has a subsidiary
specializes heavy construction. The other big five
contractors' market consists roughly of 70 percent of
building construction and 30 percent of heavy construction.
Big five plus one contractors' share in the total
building construction has increased from about 9 percent in
the late 70's to almost 11 percent in the 80's. In the
heavy construction, on the contrary, it has decreased from
7.45 percent in 1975 to 5.64 percent in 1984 reflecting the
aforementioned government and local governments policy to
give priority to the local contractors over nation-wide
contractors in public construction. This policy is more
clearly depicted in the statistics for top 43 contractors.
Their share in public construction has continuously
decreased from 30.0 percent in 1965 to 16.5 percent in 1983.
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Figure 5.1 Domestic Market Share of Top Six Contractors
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5.4 Similarity Among the Big Five Contractors
The summary of the big five contractors is given in
table 5.1. As shown, many similarities can be observed
among them. Their number of employees is between 9,000 and
13,000. Their sales are between 70 billion and 100 billion
yen. Their field of operation is limited to building
construction and heavy construction. They do not have a lot
of business in the field of industrial construction such as
petroleum refining, petrochemical plant and nuclear power
plant. They all have in-house design capability and their
own research institutes Except for Taisei-kensetsu, owners
have strong influence in their management. Their market
consists of almost 70 percent of building construction and
30 percent of heavy construction except for Takenaka
Koumuten. The percentage of foreign construction is between
5 and 10 percent, which is considerably low for the size of
operation compared with their counterpart in the U.S. and
European countries. They receive almost 80 percent of their
business from the private sector. This is accomplished
through negotiation -- not through the bidding process.
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Table 5.1 Big Five General Contractors in Japan (1984)
Kajima Taisei Shimizu Ohbayashi Takenaka
Founded in 1930 1917 1937 1936 1937
Employee 13042 12236 10181 9988 8983
Sales(B.Yen) 932062 968332 923544 766318 686476
Building 62% 70% 79% 64% 94%
Heavy 33% 27% 19% 32% 2%
Other 5% 3% 2% 4% 4%
Foreign const. 6% 7% 9% 5% 4%
Head Office Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo Osaka
President Owner (Owner) Owner Owner
R & D Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Design Cap. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Nakamura, 1985
5.5 Industrial Groups
Some of the similarities among these general
contractors can be explained by their involvement in the
industrial groups. There are mainly two types of industrial
groups in Japan. The fast and most dominant industrial
groups are so called "Zaibatsu Group", based on pre-war
zaibatsu cliques, and the second is based on large companies
that have grown up after World War II such as Toyota Motor
Corp., Hitachi Ltd., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co..
The six industrial groups of the first category are
called "Big Six", which are listed in table 5.2.
Table 5.2
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"Zaibatsu-Groups" of Japanese Industry
Name of Main bank (1) Member construction firm
the group
Nimoku-kai Mitsui Bank 24 Mitsui kensetsu
Kinyo-kai Mitsubishi Bk. 28 Mitsubishi kensetsu
Hakusui-kai Sumitomo Bkank 21 Sumitomo kensetsu
Fuyo-kai Fuji Bkank 29 Taisei kensetsu
Sansui-kai Sanwa Bank 42 Ohbayashi gumi
Sankin-kai D.K.B. (2) 45 Shimizu kensetsu
Note (1) :
(2)
Number of member companies.
Daiich-Kangyo Bank.
: Japan Economic Almanacs, 1985Source
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Table 5.3 Example of Industrial Groups
Fuyo Group (1984)
Member Companies Capital Business Sales
Fuji Bank 111375 Bank 19511375
Yasuda Trust Bank 30000 Trust Bank 8825909
Yasuda Life Insur. N.A. Life Insur. N.A.
Yasuda Fire and Marine 40500 Fire Insur. 711443
Marubeni 46693 Trading 13563875
Taisei 38869 Construction 968322
Tokyo Tatemono 5703 Real Estate 24996
Nisssin Flour 9854 Milling 314904
Sapporo Breweries 14175 Brewery 379928
Nichirei 11412 Food 276370
Nisshinbo 11377 Textile 210153
Toho Rayon 3000 Textile 85376
Sanyo kokusaku pulp 14245 Pulp 276404
Showa Denko 43730 Chemical 411660
Kureha Chemical Ind. 9944 Chemical 121766
Nippon Oil 11004 Chemical 117883
Nihhon cement 10836 Cement 157013
Toa nenryo 24490 Petro.ref 1086191
Nippon Kokan 156850 Steel 1500780
Kubota 67420 Agr.Machine 589209
Nippon seiko 24741 Bearing 237836
Nissan Motor 112473 Car 3618076
Hitachi 140154 Electric 2648207
Oki Electric 28414 Elec.appr 361866
Yokogawa Hokushin 12276 Electric 139782
Canon 27891 Bsns.Machine 485024
Tobu railway 30149 Railway 150047
Keihin railway 17279 Railway 104276
Showa line 7715 Transportation 150303
Source: Nikkan Kogyo Shinbun 11.7.85.
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Three of the big five contractors are official member
companies of such industrial groups which include: Shimizu-
kensetsu, Taisei-kensetsu and Ohbayashi-gumi belong to
Sankin-kai (D.K.B. group), Fuyo-kai (Fuji group) and Sansui-
kai (Sanwa group) respectively. In addition, Kajima-kensetsu
has close relations with Mitsui and Sumitomo groups. Table
5.4 shows major stock holders and their share in the big
five plus one contractor. The bank heading the industrial
group usually has the greatest share of the construction
firms except for the owners. However, it is not unusual
that two or more banks finance one general contractor. For
example, Sumitomo Bank and Mitsui Bank owns 4.94 percent
and 3.45 percent of Kajima's stocks respectively. Beside
their share in equity, through long term and short term
loan, theses large banks finance their member companies
intensively. Table 5.5 shows the balance sheets of
Ohbayashi Corp. and Turner Corp.. In this table, the
difference in accounting convention for construction in
progress are adjusted so as to make them compatible. It
shows that debt to equity ratio of Ohbayashi is 3.52 and
that of Turner is 1.84.
Also it is common that a corporation to belong to an
industrial group that finances construction firms outside
its group. For instance, Nippon Life Insurance finances
five of the six major contractors. Such cases are often
observed for member companies with intensive construction
investment such as life insurance companies.
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Table 5.4 Stock Holders of Big Five plus One Contractors
Share holders\Const.firms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mitsui group
Mitsui Bk.
Mitsui Trust Bk.
Mitsubishi group
Mitsubishi Bk.
Mitsubishi Trust Bk
Mitsubishi R.E.
Sumitomo group
Sumitomo Bk.
Sumitomo Trust Bk.
Sumitomo Life Ins.
Fuji group
Fuji Bk.
Yasuda Trust Bk.
Sanwa group
Sanwa Bk.
Toyo Trust Bk.
Nippon Life Ins.
3.45
2.14
2.96
4.94
1.84
1.51
3.06
1.86
1.14
5.14
2.52
4.10
0.85
2.24 1.83 6.48 2.35
D.K.B. group
D.K.B. 7.19
Fukoku Life Ins. 1.48
Owner 5.47 2.21 12.35 3.38 9.74
Employee group 2.63 5.34 3.82 5.81 0.82 4.79
Note (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Kajima-kensetsu.
Shimizu-kensetsu.
Ohbayashi-gumi.
Taisei-kensetsu.
Takenaka-koumuten.
Kumagai-gumi.
Source: Nakamura, 1985.
3.82
1.56
2.20
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Table 5.5 Adjusted Balance Sheet of Ohbayashi and Turner
(Dec 31, 1984) OHBAYASHI TURNER
(M.YEN) (M.$) (%) (M.$) (%)
ASSETS
CURRENT ASSETS
Cash 69,662 348.3 12.5% 22.7 13.5%
Mark.Sec. 45,233 226.2 8.1%
Act.Receivable 148,325 741.6 26.7% 16.2 9.7%
Inventory 152,270 761.4 27.4% 13.8 8.3%
Other 16,873 84.4 3.0% 25.8 15.4%
Total 432,363 2,161.8 77.9% 78.5 46.9%
INVESTMENT
Security 16,109 80.5 2.9%
Subsidiary 9,573 47.9 1.7%
Other 47,173 235.9 8.5% 66.1 39.5%
Total 72,855 364.3 13.1% 66.1 39.5%
PROP.PLANT.EQUIPMENT
Land 26,456 132.3 4.8% 0.8' 0.5%
Buildings 18,094 90.5 3.3% 2.7 1.6%
Machin. & Equipmt. 43,289 216.4 7.8% 9.9 5.9%
Const. in progress 1,872 9.4 0.3% 19.3 11.5%
(Acm.Depreciation) (39,662) (198.3) -7.1% (16.7)-10.0%
Total 50,049 250.2 9.0% 16.0 9.6%
OTHER ASSETS 6.7 4.0%
TOTAL ASSETS 555,267 2,776.3 100.0% 167.3 100.0%
LIABILITIES
CURRENT LIABILITIES
Bank loan 123,365 616.8 22.2% 25.8 15.4%
Acct. payable 192,589 962.9 34.7%
Accrd.expenses 9,032 45.2 1.6% 19.1 11.4%
Other 30,958 154.8 5.6% 43.9 26.2%
- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -
Total 355,944 1,779.7 64.1% 88.8 53.1%
LONG-TERM LIABILITIES
Total 76,376 381.9 13.8% 19.6 11.7%
SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY
Stocks 26,936 134.7 4.9% 4.5 2.7%
Paid in captl. 6,470 32.4 1.2% 2.0 1.2%
R.earnings 82,770 413.9 14.9% 60.8 36.3%
Other 6,771 33.9 1.2% (8.4) -5.0%
Total 122,947 614.7 22.1% 58.9 35.2%
TOTAL LIABILITIES 555,267 2,776.3 100.0% 167.3 100.0%
Sources: Annual Reports 1984 of Ohbayashi and Turner
Im
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5.6 Intra-industrial Group Vertical Integration
Although the structure of industrial groups is not a
simple one (by being involved in one or a few industrial
groups), general contractors can receive relatively constant
orders from member companies or from companies who have the
same main bank. Also as a members of such groups, they have
the advantages to cooperate with other members of the
groups. Such corporations are well illustrated in the
process of developing construction robots which is described
in the next chapter. Thus, as often pointed out, [ e.g.
Sasaki, 1981] this intra-industry group vertical integration
also works for the construction industry.
However, involvement in industrial groups also has
negative effects. For instance, the tight control within an
industrial groups is so strong that often makes it difficult
for members to effectively diversify into other fields.
For instance, even if a contractors wants to expand their
business toward development, it will be very difficult to
compete with real estate companies or private railway
companies who have much more experience in such field.
Also, such restrictive policy may deprive the contractors of
the advantage and privileges of the membership they enjoy
now.
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Being a member of an industrial group, general
contractors are expected to have the same technology because
in an industrial group, technical disadvantage of a member
construction firm is disadvantageous to the whole industrial
group. Even if it be difficult to maintain such high
technological capabilities, these firms benefit from the
protection of the group by being given first preference.
For example, Mitsubishi Motor Co. has produced "Debonair",
an mid-size car, for almost 20 years without major model
changes at the rate of less than 50 car a month. As it is
not an attractive car, no one except member companies
willing to buy it. If Mitsubishi group companies buy
similar cars from Toyota Motors or Nissan, member companies
could have enjoyed better performance, comfort and service
and Mitsubishi Motors also could have increased it's profit
by cutting off such less profitable model.
In the construction industry, such pressure for member
contractors promotes the technology transfer very quickly.
For instance, slurry walls were first introduced to Japan in
early 1960's from ICOS of Italy and took no more than five
years for all big general contractors to acquire this
technology. As Paulson pointed out, rigid social and
physical conditions in Japan require such techniques to
utilize limited land especially in the crowded area of Tokyo
and Osaka area. [Paulson, 1980a] For the Japanese
contractor technical disadvantages may be fatal even if
these advantages do not last long. Such business
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environment inevitably gives general contractor similar
character.
5.7 Intra-industry Coordination
Intra-industry coordination is another factor that
gives the general contractors a similar character. The
center of such intra-industry coordination is the Ministry
of Construction. For example, in early 60's, it committed
the Association of General Contractors (AGC) to study high-
rise structures. As a result, all the big general
contractors share the basic skill required for the high rise
building including design, construction and management of
the project. [Miura, "Nihon no Kensetsu Seisan", 1977, pp
114.) Also, the Ministry of Construction encourages general
contractors to form joint ventures to improve construction
industry financially and technically. ["Kensetsu-sho
(Ministry of construction)", 1979, pp 120.]
The private sector, as well as the public sector, have
strong incentives for the intra-industry coordination mainly
in order to stabilize their business fluctuations. Just
like other major Japanese companies, Japanese general
contractors adhere to the life employment system, which
makes organizations less flexible to business fluctuations.
Also their capital intensive nature compared to their U.S.
counterparts forces the contractors to stabilize their size
of operation to utilize their depreciable assets
effectively. Thus, these characteristics make contractors
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prefer the size of the operation to profitabilities. As
general contractors cannot share the market by types of
construction or geographical area, because of the similarity
of their character, they cooperate to share the market
through negotiation to avoid severe price competition.
However, such preference of big contractors has decreased
their profit margin continuously since the oil crisis.
(Table 5.6)
Table 5.6 Operational Profit Margin of Contractors (%)
SIZE \ YEAR 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84
LARGE 7.0 5.4 5.6 5.6 3.1 4.2 4.3 3.1
MEDIUM (BLDG) 4.0 3.9 4.5 5.1 2.2 2.5 3.0 1.9
MEDIUM (HVY) 5.9 5.0 4.9 5.8 4.3 3.9 3.8 3.4
SMALL (BLDG) 3.6 3.5 3.6 5.2 1.6 2.7 3.7 2.7
Source: Nakamura, 1985, pp38 .
Such efforts to stabilize business fluctuations also appears
in the form of joint ventures. Although joint venture was
first introduced to manage risks and to solve technical
problems, it has been used as a method to share the market
in Japan. For example, seven out of eight skyscrapers at
Shinjuku, new center of Tokyo, were completed by such joint
venture. The rest one is owned by Taisei Corporation. Such
joint venture s are commonly used even in small projects
such as condominiums of 30,000 sf..
Thus, through intra-industry group vertical integration
and through intra-industry coordination, the Japanese Big
general contractors have shared domestic construction
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market, and as a result attained their similar character.
5.8 Design Capability
Table 5.7 and table 5.8 show comparisons between top
five design and engineering firms and design divisions of
big five general contractors. Table 5.7 shows the number of
engineers and architects of those firms. For the general
contractors, these numbers include only those who work for
design divisions, while they include all engineers and
architect for the design and engineering firms. The total
number of those in five design and engineering firms is
2413, while those working for five construction firms is
4344 in 1984. Average size of general contractors' design
division is almost the same as the largest design and
engineering firm, Nikken sekkei, which has 1004 engineers
and architects. Furthermore, as this number for the design
firms is not limited to those working for design division
but also includes those working for construction management
and quantity surveying and so -forth, the actual number
working for design and engineering division is almost 600.
Therefore, design divisions of the big five general
contractors are the top five design establishment in terms
of their size.
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Table 5.7 Number of Engineers and Designers
Year 79 80 81 82 83 84
[Top Five Design and Engineering Firms]
Nikken Sekkei 951 951 966 987 1003 1004
Mitsubishi Jisho 398 420 434 428 431 418
Yamashita Sekkei 277 286 289 292 298 305
Kume Arch. 328 340 357 365 357 371
Nihon Sekkei 286 292 297 296 297 315
TOTAL TOP 5 2240 2289 2343 2368 2386 2413
[Top Five General Contractors]
Takenaka 954 1005 1131 1177 1158 1167
Taisei 723 718 690 678 619 631
Kajima 889 887 900 919 889 875
Ohbayashi 693 731 749 814 824 835
Shimizu 660 679 719 768 812 836
TOTAL TOP 5 3919 4020 4189 4356 4302 4344
Source: Nikkei-Architecture, 1980-1985
Compiled by the author
Table 5.8 Type of Building Design
BUILDING TYPE COM CONDO FAC GYM EDCT HOSP
[Top Five Design and Engineering Firms]
Nikken Sekkei 27% 12% 9%
Mitsubishi Jisho 63%
Yamashita Sekkei
Kume Arch. 16% 22% 12%
Nihon Sekkei 30% 10%
[Top Five General Contractors]
Takenaka 25% 14% 10%
Taisei 25% N.A. 20%
Kajima 22% 11% 37%
Ohbayashi 30% 15% 18%
Shimizu 31% 17% 25%
N.B.
COM: Commercial building CONDO: Condominium
FAC: Factory GYM: Gymnasium
EDCT: Educational bldg. HOSP: Hospital
Source: Nikkei-Architecture, 1980-1985
Compiled by the author
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5.8.1 Design-Build Contract
The term design-build contract in the U.S. refers to a
system in which design firms, engineering firms and builders
cooperate with one another from the programming stage of a
project in order to perform fast track construction and cost
effectiveness of the project. In Japan, however, it refers
to a special contract between a general contractor and an
owner that the general contractor will do everything from
planning to the completion of the construction without
employing outside design and engineering firms. This
peculiar design build contract comes from the fact that
architectural design is not yet established as an
independent profession in Japan. In fact, even two of the
five top design firms, Nikken-Sekkei and Mitsubishi-Jisho,
used to be in-house architects for the "Zaibatsu" cliques.
Coincidently, they belongs to the groups, Sumitomo group and
Mitsubishi group, that do not have one of big five
contractors as their members.
Table 5.9 shows the amount of such design-build
contracts for building construction and total building
construction contract. It accounts for about 40 percent of
total building construction in all the five contractors.
Particularly, Takenaka-koumuten, which specializes in
building construction, has a high percentage (about 50
percent) of design-build contract. As the market share of
those contractors in building construction is about 10%,
they design almost 4 % of the total building in Japan.
115
Table 5.9 Design-Build Contract by the General Contractors
Year 79 80 81 82 83 84
DESIGN BUILD CONTRACT (Billion Yen)
Takenaka 247 336 332 346 332 297
Taisei 190 176 130 215 248 247
Kajima 190 178 234 233 200 253
Ohbayashi 155 194 207 191 189 194
Shimizu 248 250 262 325 306 288
TOTAL TOP 5 1029 1134 1164 1310 1275 1279
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT (Billion Yen)
Takenaka 520 589 648 685 660 666
Taisei 505 547 685 659 642 649
Kajima 392 528 612 613 553 554
Ohbayashi 378 456 482 468 512 485
Shimizu 605 632 727 816 758 722
TOTAL TOP 5 2401 2752 3154 3242 3125 3076
PERCENTAGE OF DESIGN BUILD CONTRACT TO TOTAL BLDG. CONTRACT
Takenaka 48% 57% 51% 50% 50% 45%
Taisei 38% 32% 19% 33% 39% 38%
Kajima 48% 34% 38% 38% 36% 46%
Ohbayashi 41% 43% 43% 41% 37% 40%
Shimizu 41% 40% 36% 40% 40% 40%
TOTAL TOP 5 43% 41% 37% 40% 41% 42%
Source: Nikkei-Architecture, 1980-1985
Compiled by the author
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Nevertheless, design division of general contractors
used to be an unimportant part of their business until the
so called "High Growth Era" ended in the early 70's by the
oil crisis. During this era, general contractors could
easily obtain contracts sufficient to keep themselves busy
and offered design services only upon owners request.
Recently, however, design divisions of the general
contractors have been considered to be an essential part of
the business and one of the major strategies to increase
market share.
According to the survey conducted by "Nikkei
architecture" [July 15, 1985], the major types of
structures, applying design-build contract are commercial
buildings, condominiums and factories, which account for 25-
30 percent, 10-17 percent and 14-22 percent of the total
design build contracts respectively. These percentages does
not vary so much within the top general contractors,
whereas, as shown in table 5.7, top design firms seem to
have their own specialties.
Although general contractors can design buildings that
require aesthetic design or special design skills such as
museums, auditoriums, hospitals and colleges and it is not
unusual that they win design competitions, their majority
of work is such buildings where they can demonstrate their
organizational and size advantage. Thus, similarities among
big five contractors can be observed also in their design
divisions.
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5.8.2 Strength of Design-Build Contract
The strength of this design-build contract is that they
can fully utilize the organizational advantages to cut the
project schedule, to find optimum balance of quality and
cost and to construct failure free buildings.
From the planning phase of the project, many divisions
such as construction engineering, structural design, legal
consultation and marketing participate in the project to
facilitate the process in the most effective manner;
engineering divisions propose the most effective
construction methods, structural design divisions proposes
the best suited structural systems, marketing divisions
study alternative uses of the lot and so on.
Thus, design-build contracts by general contractors in
Japan provide very convenient systems for the owners.
5.8.3 CAD Application
During these design-build processes, computers are
fully utilized for structural analysis and computer aided
design. Although the basic technology of Computer Aided
Design and Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) came from
the United States, it's application to the construction
industry is most effectively developed and used most
extensively by general contractors in Japan. All the five
general contractors have developed their own CAD system,
which is not only used for drafting and presentation
purposes but also for sharing data with various activities,
such as structural design, engineering design, quantity
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surveying in order to eliminate redundancy, to review
alternatives from various areas and to speed up the design
process. [Takase, 1985]
For example, Ohbayashi-gumi has developed a Totalized
Architectural Design and Drafting System (TADD), which
incorporates with CADAM, enables extensive use of CAD by
architectural, structural and engineering designers.
Furthermore, part of this system is sold through CADAM.
5.9 Safety Control
Safety control is one major issue that must be
solved in the construction industry. In Japan , those who
are injured and killed account for 29.2 percent and 41.1
percent on the total industry in 1984 respectively
[Ministry of Labor, 1985]. However, occupational injury in
Japan has decreased during the last two decades. As shown
in figure 5.3, frequency rate, which is given by the number
of injury per one million working hour, has decreased in
Japan while it has gradually increased from 1961 in the
U.S.. Furthermore, the frequency rate for the construction
industry has decreased more significantly from 12.7, which
is higher than that of total industry, in 1965 to 2.2 in
1984, which is substantially lower than that of total
industry. In the U.S., however, it is 11.0 for the total
industry and 19.4 for the construction industry, which is
still among the highest in total industry.
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The big construction firms have still better records.
Figure 5.4 shows frequency rates of total industry, the
construction industry, the manufacturing industry and
Ohbayashi-gumi for the last twenty years. It has decreased
to less than one tenth during the last twenty years and now
it is lower than that of manufacturing industry since 1981.
This significant decrease of occupational injury in Japan is
performed by the policy of Ministry of Labor to put
responsibility of safety control on the employer. In the
construction industry, the project manager of general
contractors is responsible for the safety control at the
site. If there is a violation of safety codes or negligence
that results in accidents, the project manager is
prosecuted. For instance, in December 1984, sixteen
construction workers were injured or killed in a project of
old bridge demolition. Recently, not only the project
manager but also engineers at the head office of the general
contractor were prosecuted [The Asahi, March 26, 1986].
Furthermore, such accidents will disqualify contractors to
bid public works.
Thus, the cost of accidents is very expensive for
contractors both directly and indirectly, and is the major
motivation for general contractors to decrease occupational
injury at construction sites. To decrease accidents,
special division are set up to regularly make visits to
construction sites and check safety conditions. Also, they
sometimes make safety training programs for subcontractors.
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5.10 Research and Development
One of the characteristics of general contractors in
Japan is their research and development (R&D) capabilities.
As Paulson wrote, Japanese general contractors have
successfully adopted the organized pattern of R&D.
[Paulson, 1980a] In 1983, R&D expenditure by construction
industry in Japan was 101.3 billion yes (about 500 million
dollar). It was 2.2 percent of total R&D expenditures by
industries in Japan. The big five general contractors spend
29.0 billion yen which was 28.6 percent of total R&D
expenditure by the construction industry. 1612 employees
work for their R&D institutes which account for 3 percent of
total employees. The ratio of their R&D expenditures to the
total sales and operational profit were 0.79 percent and
19.6 percent in 1983 respectively. [Report on the Survey of
Research and Development, 1984]
According to Paulson, their incentives for the general
contractors to put much emphasis on the R&D activities are
as follows:
1) Strict building codes.
2) Japan's rigid physical and social constraints.
3) Safety requirement.
4) Prequalification documentation needed bid on major
public works.
5) Tax incentives.
6) Competitive technical edge given to company by
patenting and licensing technologies for more
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productive, economic effective construction design
and procedures.
Thus, the political social and business environment make the
general contractors to put much emphasis on the R&D
activities.
The construction industry's internal expenditure on
R&D by type of activity is shown in table 5.10.
Table 5.10 R&D Expenditures by Type of Activity. (1983)
Type of Activity Expenditure (Million Yen) Percentage
Basic Research 5,714 5.6%
Applied Research 24,489 24.2%
Development 71,136 70.2%
Source: Report on the Survey of Research and Development,
1984
This percentage distribution is almost the same with total
industry. The tendency to put much importance on
development rather than basic research is commonly found in
Japanese industries. There are two reasons for it. The
first reason is that R&D by industries, institutes and
universities share the total R&D by type of activity. Table
5.11 shows the type of R&D activity by kind of
organization.
123
Table 5.11 Type of R&D Activity by Kind of Organization
Organization Industries Institutes University
Basic Research 5.7% 12.6% 56.4%
Applied Research 22.0% 30.8% 35.7%
Development 72.3% 56.6% 7.9%
Source: Report on the Survey of Research and Development
1985
As a result of this sharing, R&D in industries can
concentrate on the development.
The second reason is the aforementioned industrial
groups. Many companies in different fields can cooperate
with another to make the most of their R&D capability as a
group and avoid redundant basic research. Table 5.12 shows
the R&D by other industries in the field of construction.
Not only the construction industry but also other industries
make research areas in the field of construction. Among
them, industries that produce construction material such as
chemical industry, ceramic and clay product industry and
steel and iron industry have almost a 5 percent share of R&D
in construction.
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Table 5.12 Construction R&D by All Industry
Industry Expenditure (Million Yen) Percentage
All Industries 88,980 100.00%
Agriculture 37 0.04%
Construction 63,132 70.95%
Mining 109 0.12%
Chemicals 4,741 5.33%
Ceramics & Clay 3,876 4.36%
Iron & Steel 4,251 4.78%
Fabricated metal products 1,322 1.49%
General Machinery 1,202 1.35%
Transportation, Communication 4,332 4.87%
& public Utilities
Source: Report on the Survey
1984
of Research and Development
On the contrary, R&D by construction industries is limited
in the field of construction indicating the nature of
construction industry that has limited intermediate output
and secondary products and their reluctance to diversify
into other fields of operation, such as petroleum refinery.
The organization and research conducted by Taisei
corporation are shown in figure 5.5. It does not vary much
within the big five general contractors.
D
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Figure 5.5 Organization and Research Conducted by
Taisei Corporation
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Source: Technical Research Institute Taisei Corporation,
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5.11 Quality Control
Total Quality Control (TQC) has been the most
controversial issue among the big general contractors in
Japan during the last ten years. The principles of total
quality control by Feigenbaum, who first introduced the
concept of total quality control in 1961, is excerpted in
appendix four at the end of this chapter. TQC was fist
introduced by Takenaka-koumuten in 1976. Takenaka was
awarded the "Deming prize" in 1979, which is given to a few
firms with excellent quality-control program, as the first
construction firm in Japan. Two more general contractors
of the big five, Kajima and Shimizu, announced introduction
of TQC in the late 70's and also were awarded the same prize
in the early 80's. As like many other technologies, TQC has
transferred very quickly in the construction industry. Now,
all of the top general contractors have introduced quality-
control programs in varying degree.
The concept of Quality Control (QC) was first
introduced by Dr. Deming to Japan immediately after WW II.
It was widely applied by many manufacturing firms during the
50's and 60's. In the construction industry, however, it
was not introduced until the "High Growth Era" ended by the
first oil crisis, because of the supply side market due to
"hot" domestic construction. According to Araki, the major
motivation to introduce TQC by construction firms was a
strategy to increase their market share facing the shrinking
domestic market after the first oil crisis [Araki, 1980].
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The application of TQC in the construction industry,
however, have many problems. For instance, construction
workers are less conscious about the quality of the work
they perform. They have difficulty in understanding some
fundamentals necessary for the Statistical Quality Control
(SQC) such as standard deviation. The production process is
less repetitive and no project has exactly the same
condition as another project. Many participants from
different organizations, such as designers, engineers,
general contractors and subcontractors, are involved in a
project and their relationship is only temporary. Their
responsibilities to the final product is not clear. For
example, if a roof reaks, it is often difficult to identify
whether it is due to the careless detail design by the
architect or negligence of the general contractor's
supervision and inspection or defective workmanship by the
subcontractors. Also it is very difficult to measure the
performance of a project. Evaluation of a building is quite
subjective and differs by the point of view from which it is
evaluated.
The big general contractors in Japan certainly have
advantages to introduce TQC to their counterparts in the
U.S. from these points of view. As shown earlier in this
chapter, they are extensively involved in both service
oriented areas of construction such as design, programming,
engineering and R&D and actual production processes at the
site. Their relationship with the owner is not a temporary
128
one, but a perpetual one through industrial groups. Also
they have a stable relationship with their hierarchical
subcontractors and, therefore, they have incentives to
invest and educate subcontractors fundamentals of TQC. TQC
is also practiced in their sales, engineering and design
divisions.
In addition, the construction industry itself has some
features that make the application of TQC more attractive.
Unlike the products of the manufacturing industry, the
products of the construction industry are well defined in
some sense because the requirement of the owner is usually
identified before production in contrast, progress of the
manufacturing industry are difficult to identify.
Subsequently, marketing is the one of the essential parts
of TQC. Moreover, as almost no effort was made in the
construction industry to apply TQC, the effect of it must be
greater than that in the other industries.
The actual process of introducing TQC took at least
three years and required many human resources to establish
the program and to educate members including those of
subcontractors. The introduction of TQC, however, also
created stress in the traditional and stable "Japanese"
organization. Those who are involved in the TQC often
complain. Also, there have been a lot of counter arguments
to TQC and many books against TQC were published [e.g.
Kamada, 1985]. However, these counter arguments discusses
only the side effect of the introduction and not address the
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and concerning TQC's potential for reducing effectiveness of
the introduction and not essential arguments no essential
argument was made to decrease the effectiveness of TQC.
As Feigenbaum wrote, TQC is a customer-oriented program
and the owners surely benefit from it in terms of the cost
effectiveness of their investment. Therefore, it must be an
effective strategy to penetrate in the construction market.
It was quite reasonable that Takenaka-Koumuten introduced
TQC because the construction market was not actively
utilizing their surplus human resources. The process of
introducing TQC by construction firms is similar to the way
Japanese other industry have increased their
competitiveness.from recessions or hostile environment.
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5.12 Summary of Chapter Five
1) Big five general contractors in Japan have dominated
the domestic construction market since before the World
War II and have kept their position.
2) They have a lot of similarity.
3) Their similarity is attained by intra-industry
coordination and intra- industry coordination.
4) Their design divisions have largest design and
engineering organization in Japan.
5) Their design-build contract is a customer oriented
system, utilizing their scale merit such as Computer
Aided Design,
6) Their accident frequency rate is lower than that of
the manufacturing industry and that of the U.S.
construction industry by far.
7) Business, social, physical and political environment in
Japan encourages R&D activity in the construction
industry.
8) They introduced TQC after the first oil crisis in order
to provide most cost-effective products and services
for customers.
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APPENDIX FIVE TOTAL QUALITY CONTROL
Excerpt from Feigenbaum, A.V., TOTAL QUALITY CONTROL third
edition, 1983, pp.823-829
The principles of Total Quality Control: A Summary
A series of "principles" continues to simmer out of
industry's experience with the management of quality and
total quality control.
An interpretation of these principles is presented
below. It is offered as a summary of the "total quality
management" approach which regards the quality of products
and services as primary business strategy and fundamental
determinant for business health, growth, and economic
viability.
1. Total quality control may be defined as
An effective system for integrating the quality
development, quality-maintenance, and quality
improvement efforts of various groups in an
organization so as to enable marketing, engineering,
production, and service at the most economical levels
which allow for full customer satisfaction.
2. In the phase "quality control," the word "quality does
not have the popular meaning of "best" in any absolute
sense. It means "best for certain customer requirements."
These requirements are the (a) actual use and (b) selling
price of the product.
3. In the phrase "quality control," the word "control"
represents a management tool with four steps:
a. Setting quality standards
b. Appraising conformance to these standards
c. Acting when the standards are exceeded
d. Planning for improvements in the standards
4. Several quality-control methods have carried on in
industry for many years. What is new in the modern approach
to quality control is (a) the integration if these often
unconnected activities and an engineered, operating systems
framework which places the responsibility for customer-
oriented quality efforts across all the main-line activities
of an enterprise, giving quality organizationwide impact,
and (b) the addition to the time-tested methods used of the
new quality-control technologies which have been found
useful in dealing with and thinking about the increased
emphasis upon reliability in product design and precision in
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parts manufacture.
5. As a major new business strategic area, quality is
explicitly structured to contribute to business
profitability and positive cash flow. Total-quality-control
programs are highly cost-effective because of their results
in improved levels of customer satisfaction, reduced
operating costs, reduced operating losses and field service
costs, and improved utilization of resources.
6. The need for such programs is underscored by changing
buyer-producer relationships and major market place demands
for quality. These are reflected in mounting product and
service liability trends and consumer pressures which impact
strongly upon products. In addition, there are new social
and economic demands for more effective materials use and
production processes to turn out increasingly
technologically based products, new working patterns in
factories and offices, and a growing trend toward inter
nationalization of market.
7. The factors affecting product quality can be divided
into two major groupings: (a) the technological, that is ,
machines, materials, and processes; (b) the human, that is,
operators, foremen, and other company personnel. Of these
two factors, the human is of greater importance by far.
8. Total quality control is an important aid to the good
engineering designs, good manufacturing methods, and
conscientious product service activity that have always been
required for the delivery of high-quality articles.
9. The fundamentals of quality control are basic to any
manufacturing process, whether the product is a nuclear
reactor, a space vehicle, a consumer durable, or bakery,
drug, brewery products. They are equally basic to so-called
service industries, where the product may be an intangible,
such as medical care, hotel accomodations, or telephone
communications.
Although the approach is somewhat different if the
production is job shop rather than large quantity or small
components rather than large apparatus, the same
fundamentals still obtain. This difference in approach can
be readily summarized: In mass-production manufacturing,
quality-control activities center on the product, whereas
in job-lot manufacturing, they are a matter of controlling
the process.
10. Quality control enters into all phases of the
industrial production process, starting with the costomer's
specification and sale to the customer through design
engineering and assembly to shipment of the product and
installation and field service for a customer who remains
satisfied with the product.
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11. Effective control over the factors affecting quality
demands controls at all important stages of the production
and service processes. These controls can be termed the job
of quality control, and they fall into four natural
classifications:
a. New-design control
b. Incoming-material control
c. Product control
d. Special process studies
12. New-design control involves the establishment and
specification of the desirable cost-quality, performance-
quality, safety-quality, and reliability-quality standards
for the product, including the elimination of location of
possible source of quality troubles before the start of
formal production.
13. Incoming-material control involves the receiving and
stocking, at the most economical levels of quality, of only
those parts, materials, and components whose quality
conforms to the specification requirements.
14. Product control involves the control of products at the
source of production and through field service so that
departures from the quality specification can be corrected
before defective products are manufactured and proper
product service can be maintained in the field.
15. Special process studies involves investigation and
tests to locate the causes of defective products so as to
improve quality characteristics and implement permanent
corrective action.
16. A total quality system may be defined as
The agreed companywide and plantwide operating work
structure, documented in effective, integrated
technical and managerial procedures, for guiding the
coordinated actions of the people, the machines, and
the information of the company and plant in the best
and most practical ways to assure customer quality
satisfaction and economical costs and quality.
The quality system provides integrated and continuous
control to all key activities, making it truly
organizationwide in scope.
17. The details for each quality-control program must be
tailored to fit the needs of individual plants, but certain
basic areas of attention are common to most programs for
total quality control.
18. The target of the quality program attention is to
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control product quality throughout the process of design,
manufacturing,shipment, and service so as to prevent the
occurance of unsatisfactory quality.
19. Benefits often resulting from total quality programs
are improvements in product quality and design, reduction of
production-line bottlenecks. By-product benefits are
improved inspection and test methods, sounder setting of
time standards for labor, definite schedules for preventive
maintenance, the availability of powerful data for use in
company advertising, and furnishing of factual basis for
cost accounting standards for scrap, rework, and inspection.
20. Quality cost are a means for measuring and optimizing
total-quality-control activities.
21. Operating quality costs are divided into four different
classifications:
a. Preventive costs, which include quality planning and
other costs associated with preventive nonconformance and
defects.
b. Appraisal costs, or the costs of incurred in evaluating
product quality to maintain established quality levels.
c. Internal failure costs, caused by defective and
nonconforming materials and products that do not meet
company quality specifications. These include scrap,
rework, and spoilage.
d. External failure costs, caused by defective and
nonconforming products reaching the customer. They include
complaints and in-warranty product service costs, costs of
product recall, court costs, and liability penalties.
22. Cost reductions - particularly reduction in operating
quality costs - result from total quality control for two
reasons:
a. Industry has often lacked effective, customer oriented
quality standards. It has, therefore, often unrealistically
tilted the scale in the balance between the cost of quality
in product and the service that the product is to render.
b. An expenditure in the area of prevention can have a
severalfold advantage in reducing costs in the area of
internal failure and external failure. A saving of many
dollars for each dollar spent in prevention is often
experienced.
23. Organizationwise, total quality control is management's
tool for delegating authority and responsibility for product
quality, thus relieving itself of unnecessary detail while
retaining the means of assuring that quality results will be
satisfactory. There are two basic concepts important in
organizing for quality control.
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The first is that quality is everybody's job. Every
component has quality-related responsibility, e.g.,
Marketing for determining customers' quality preferences,
engineering for specifying product quality specifications,
and Shop Supervision for building quality into the product.
The second concept is that because quality is
everybody's job, it may become nobody's job. Management
must recognize that many individual responsibilities for
quality will be exercised most effectively when they are
buttressed and served by a well-organized, full-time,
genuinely modern management function whose only area of
operation is in the quality-control jobs.
24. While the general manager must, in principle, become
the chief designer of the quality program, the general
manager and the other major company functions are assisted
by an effective, modern, quality-control function.
25. This quality-control organizational component has twin
objectives: (a) to provide quality assurance for the
company's product, i.e., simply to be sure that the products
shipped are right, and (b) to assists in assuring optimum
quality costs for those products. It fulfills these
objectives through its three subfunction: quality
engineering, process-control engineering, and quality
information equipment engineering. These quality control
subfunctions provide basic engineering technologies that are
applicable to any product for assuring its right quality at
optimum quality cost.
26. Quality engineering contributes to the quality planning
which is fundamental to the entire quality-control program
for the company.
27. Process-control engineering monitors the application of
this quality-control program on the production floor and
thus gradually supplants the older policing inspection
activity.
28. Quality information equipment engineering designs and
develops the inspection and testing equipment for obtaining
the necessary quality measurements and controls. Wherejustified, this equipment is combined with production to
provide automatic feedback or results for control of the
process. All pertinent results are then analyzed as basis
for adjustment and corrective action on the process.
29. From the human relations point of view, quality-control
organization is both a
a. Channel of communication for product-quality information
among all concerned employees and groups.
b. Means of participation in the over all quality-control
program by these employees and groups.
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Quality-control organization is a means of breaking down the
attitude sometimes held by factory operators and functional
specialist that "our quality responsibility is so small a
part of the whole that we're really not a part of the plant
quality-control program nor are we important to it."
30. Total-quality-control programs should be developed
carefully within a given company. It is often wise to
select one or two quality areas, to achieve successful
results in attacking them, and to let the program grow step
by step in this fashion.
31. Necessary to the success of the quality program in a
plant is the very intangible but extremely important spirit
of quality-mindedness, extending from top management right
to the men and women at the bench.
32. Whatever may be new about the total-quality-control
program for a plant must be closely coupled throughout the
entire plant organization so as to obtain willing acceptance
and cooperation.
33. A quality-control program must have the complete
support of the top management. With lukewarm management
support, no amount of selling to the rest of the
organization can be genuinely effective.
34. Management must recognize at the outset of its total-
qulity-control program that this program is not a temporary
quality improvement or quality cost reduction project. Only
when the major problems represented by the internal quality
improvements and cost reductions are out of the way can be
the quality-control program take over its long-range role of
the management control over quality.
35. Statistics are used in an overall quality-control
program whenever and wherever they may be useful, but
statistics are only one part of the total-quality-control
pattern; they are not the pattern itself. The five
statistical tools that have come to be used in quality
control activities are
a. Frequency distributions
b. Control charts
c. Sampling tables
d. Special methods
e. Product reliability
The point of view represented by these statistical methods
has, however, had profound effect upon the entire area of
total quality control.
36. The statistical point of view in total quality resolves
essentially in to this: Variation in product quality must
be constantly studied - within batches of product, on
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processing equipments, between different lots of the same
article, on critical quality characteristics and standards.
This variation may best be studied by the analysis of
samples selected from the lots of product or from units
produced by the same processing equipments. The development
of advanced electronic and mechanical test equipment has
provided basic improvement in the approach to this task.
37. The demands of total quality control are increased by
automation of the manufacturing process. With automatic
equipment, higher quality levels for parts sometimes are
necessary for trouble-free operation. In fact, until higher
quality levels are attained, excessive down time may make
operation of the automated process uneconomic. Rapid
detection of out-of-control conditions, feedback for process
adjustment, and quick response of the process to correction
are essential to low defect and noneconomic rates.
38. An important feature of total quality program is that
it controls quality at the source. An example is its
positive effect in stimulating and building up operator
responsibility for, and interest in, product quality through
measurements taken by the operator at the station.
39. Product reliability is, in effect, "product function
over the product life expectancy(time)." It is a part of the
balanced total product-quality requirement - just as are
appearance, maintenability, serviceability, supportability,
and so on - and hence cannot be treated separately from
total quality control.
40. The total quality program provides the discipline,
methodology, and techniques to assure consistently high
product quality in the four basic job of
a. New-design control
b. Incoming-material control
c. Product control
d. Special process studies
It coordinates the effort of the people, the machines, and
the information which are basic to total quality control to
provide high customer quality satisfaction which brings
competitive advantage to the company.
Quality is, in its essence, a way of managing. And
total quality control's organizationwide impact involves the
managerial and technical implementation of customer-oriented
quality activities as a prime responsibility of general
management and of the mainline operations of marketing,
engineering, production, industrial relations, finance, and
service as well as of the quality-control function itself at
the most economical levels which provide full customer
satisfaction.
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CHAPTER 6 ROBOTS DEVELOPED BY GENERAL CONTRACTORS
IN JAPAN
6.1 Introduction
The term "Robot" was first used by Czeck writer Karel
Capek after Czeck word "Robota", which means compulsory, in
1923. Robots became very popular through cartoons and
science fiction. However, it was not until the early 1960's
that the first industrial robot was produced in the U.S..
The first industrial robot introduced in Japan, a simple
playback robot, was imported from the U.S. in 1967.
In the early 70's they were introduced mainly into the
automotive industry which suffered labor shortage due to
rapid increasing exports. During the 70's, many firms in
the manufacturing industry introduced robots into their
production lines. By the end of 70's, they had outgrown
their novelty in secondary industry .
Finally, in the 80's it extended out of manufacturing
industry to other industries. The "Japanese Economic
Journal" describes the current situation of robots
introduction in Japan as follows:
A recent noteworthy trend is that demand for industrial
robots has began to shift from its traditional strong
hold in manufacturing industry to construction,
commerce, and primary sector areas such as farming,
forestry fishing. [Japan Economic Journal, 1985]
The purpose of this chapter is to make a study of the
application of industrial robots in the construction
industry, and to make a brief survey of construction robots
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developed by general contractors in Japan in particular.
Also, several strategies to develop construction robots are
proposed.
6.2 Definition and Industrial Robots
in Manufacturing Industry
The definition of an industrial robot by Robot
Institute of America is as follows:
A robot is a reprogramable multifunctional manipulator
designed to move parts, tools or specified devices
through revisable programed motion.
It is distinguished from conventional automation by its
multifunctional and reprogramable functions. Therefore,
while conventional automation is usually for mass-production
of single product, industrial robots are introduced for even
small production of various products.
The Japanese Industrial Robot Association classifies
industrial robots into six types according to their
complexity as follows from lower degree to higher degree of
automation.
1) Manual manipulator
2) Fixed sequence robot
3) Variable sequence robot
4) Playback robot
5) Numerical control robot
6) Intelligent robot
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The number of industrial robots by country is shown in
table 6.1. It shows that robots are most widely introduced
by Japanese industries.
Table 6.1 Number of Industrial Robot by Country (1982)
Country \ Type of Robot (3) (4) (5) (6)
Japan 14,000 3,000
U.S.A. 3,000 2,200
W. Germany 850 450
Source: Japanese Industrial Robot Association, 1984.
Note: (3) Variable sequence robot. (4) Playback robot.
(5) Numerical control robot. (6) Intelligent robot.
Almost all of these robots have been introduced by the
manufacturing industry. In the manufacturing industry, the
following reasons have accelerated the introduction of
robots:
1) High utilization rate allows low capital
consumption per unit production. (Economies of Scale)
2) Increased demand variation in the recent years.
3) Sharp wage increase especially for skilled worker.
4) A reduction in the cost of computing equipment that
controls the robots.
5) Technical and system development have made many
tasks feasible for robots.
6) Through mass-production, manufacturing industry is
familiar with mechanization and have achieved high
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degree of industrialization.
According to Kunimoto [1984], the active introduction
of industrial robots in Japan is due to the following facts
in addition:
1) Active R&D in industries promotes
application of advanced technology.
2) Participation of small- and mid-size firms
accelerated the development of various type of robots.
3) Development of advanced technology, control devices
in particular, made the robots economically feasible.
4) Workers' consciousness of quality and productivity
made themselves accept introduction of robots to the
production line without serious objection.
5) Incentives provided by government such as tax
deduction encouraged establishments to introduce them.
However, most of the industrial robots introduced in
Japan are rather lower level robots compared with the U.S..
The reason for this is that they are not introduced
individually but introduced so that they work as a part of
systems. These systems which consist of many robots, are
called Flexible Manufacturing System (FMS). FMS is a system
that can produce many kinds of products on one production
line and can easily correspond to design change of products.
For example, in the factory of Toyota Motor Co., cars of
several different types are produced in one production line.
The features
capability of each
them individually.
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of FMS are that it can utilize the
robot more effectively than introducing
It increases the utilization rate of
robot by producing several kinds of products on one
production lines, and make the factory compact. The last
feature, in particular, may be one reason why construction
investment has not shown significant increase, regardless of
the peak of national economy until after the first oil
crisis. According to Hasegawa [1984], FMS has been
introduced since early 70's in Japan, and has spread much
faster than any other countries. The number of such system
is almost twice as much as those in the U.S. in 1982
[Hasegawa, 1984].
Thus, successful introduction of industrial robots not
only depends on the performance and technology of each
individual robot, but also on the coordination among robots
in order to make the system truly effective. It makes the
introduction of robots economically feasible.
Nevertheless, there are some drawbacks to this FMS.
The first draw back is: as the systems become more complex,
it becomes more difficult to control them, and,
particularly in the case of system failure, it is difficult
to resume regular operation quickly. The second draw back
is: as technology involved in FMS is developing very
rapidly, it may become obsolete soon before these systems
are fully depreciated.
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6.3 Robot Application in the Construction Industry
In the construction industry, robotics application is
still on the testing phase and does not have many
precedences. However it is expected to be used more
extensively in the future for the following reasons and
therefore quite prospective field.
The first reason is that there is necessity to increase
productivity in the construction industry. The
productivity of the construction industry has not increased
significantly as the manufacturing industry has in the last
few decades, and the use of construction robots is expected
to increase productivity. The major factor that had
increased the productivity of the manufacturing industry was
mass production until the end of 60's. However the
technology of mass production did not work in the production
process of construction. Therefore, as shown in chapter
three, the cost escalation of the construction industry is
much faster than that of the manufacturing industry. The
construction robot will be the first automated
industrialization in the construction industry.
Secondly, as shown in chapter five, construction
industry is still among the most hazardous industries. In
fact, the number of those who lost life in the construction
industry account more than 40 percent of total industry.
The introduction of robots is expected to improve such
hazardous working conditions.
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Finally, the third objective of construction robots is
to control the quality of construction, especially in the
quality as defined in the Total Quality Control TQC. As the
construction industry depends so much on labor, the quality
of products vary much depending on the skill of workers. It
is very difficult to decrease such deviation of quality of
the product. However, there is an obvious fact that owners
require better quality for the cost they pay for.
Construction robots are expected to contribute in the
quality control programs.
6.4 Problems of Construction Robot
Nevertheless, there are many problems that prevent the
application of robotics in the construction industry. They
can be categorized into three major problems; 1) Technical
problems, 2) Economical problems, and 3) organizational
problems.
6.4.1 Technical Problems
Although the construction industry has some
similarities with the manufacturing industry, such as
assembling components, it has a lot of characteristics that
have prevented the industrialization commonly found in the
manufacturing industry.
In a typical manufacturing industry, products go
through the production line while in the construction
industry products usually (the structure) remain in a
permanent location forcing each crew to go to that specific
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point to perform their tasks. Therefore, if the
construction robots are to replace labor, they must have
mobility. However, mobility of robots, mobile robot without
tracking rail in particular, still remains as a problem.
Another technical problem is handling capacity of
industrial robots. Components used in the construction
industry are usually heavier than those of the manufacturing
industry. Typical handling weight of industrial robots
ranges from 50 to 200 lb. [Warszawski, 1984, 15] while some
components used in construction range in tons.
Tasks involved in the construction themselves also have
several problems. Unlike the tasks particularly found in
the manufacturing industry those in the construction
industry are ill-structured and difficult to teach robots
them. Tasks involved in construction use all function of
human labor such as sensing, walking, handling and thinking.
Furthermore, they are less repetitive, and, therefore, it is
difficult to use lower level industrial robots such as
variable sequence robots.
Although the introduction of industrial robots are not
for mass-production of single product but, for such rather
ill-structured tasks, those in construction are far more
complex and ill-structured than those in the manufacturing
industry.
This problem is due in part due to the building system
which was originally developed for human workers and
conventional construction machinery. Usually, building
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components are designed for either workers or conventional
construction machinery such as cranes. For example, gypsum
boards and concrete blocks are designed for human labor and
precast concrete and steel structures are designed for
construction machinery. Neither of them are best suitable
size and shape for robots.
6.4.2 Economical Problems
With all these technical problems, what makes
construction robots remain at the test phase is economics.
Although few of the construction robots disclose their
prices, the cost of construction robots including
development cost and cost saving at construction site have
never published. This fact indicates implicitly their
economical infeasibility so far.
Low utilization rate of construction machinery and
equipment in particular makes construction firms reluctant
to invest in such capital assets. This low utilization rate
stem from the facts that construction products are usually
assembled at site and machinery must be transported from
site to site. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that this
machinery can be used continuously. Also, the volume of a
task per site is limited and it will require further
investment to use a robot for various tasks.
6.4.3 Organizational problems
In addition to technical and economical problems, there
are still organizational problems. Unlike the manufacturing
industry the construction industry is highly fragmented and
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no single firm can take the initiative in the project. In
other words, few construction firm have tried to coordinate
the construction industry and to take the risk of developing
construction robots.
This fragmented structure of construction industry also
makes it difficult to make systems of construction robots
that have been very effective in manufacturing industry.
Unlike the manufacturing industry, tasks are too independent
to be organized into a standard system.
The development of construction robots requires various
kinds of technology and experience in the real construction.
Therefore, it is difficult for a construction firm or
manufacturer to develop them without cooperating with many
establishment outside their own industry.
6.5 Construction Robots Developed by General Contractors in
Japan
General contractors in Japan, however, have had some
advantages in solving some of these problems listed above.
Actually, almost all of the construction robots were
developed by general contractors in Japan as of 1985.
First of all, as described in chapter five, they are
deeply involved in actual construction and own much
construction machinery. As shown in table 5.5, the leading
contractor in Japan has more than twenty times construction
machinery and equipment as that in the U.S.. Their capital
intensive nature shows that the mechanization of
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construction industry accounts them to invest further in
construction robots. Actually, some of the robots have been
developed for the use on conventional machinery. The fact
that these firms owns so much machinery enhances the
development of robots.
Secondly, they have taken the initiative in the
construction industry to organize and lead hierarchical
subcontracting groups. They have always acted as a risk
taker in the construction industry, introducing new
technology such as slurry wall since 1960's.
Thirdly, as a member of industrial groups, they can
relatively easily cooperate with other manufacturing firms.
Actually, many of the construction robots have been
developed by joint research between general contractors and
manufacturing firms. For example, the concrete distributor
developed by Ohbayashi-gumi was made possible by joint
research between Ohbayashi-gumi and Mitsubishi-jyukogyo.
Fourthly, as Japan has limited land and, moreover,
(the construction investment in Japan is concentrated in
Metropolitan Tokyo area), the utilization rate of machinery
is higher than that in the U.S..
Finally, as described in chapter five, intra-industry
coordination works in the development of construction
robots. The Ministry of Construction funds 400 million yen
for the special research project of construction robotics.
Eleven general contractors, of which five are the big five
contractors, participate in the project and share the
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results.
Thus, the construction industry in Japan has fully
utilized their advantages described in chapter five to
develop construction robots.
Table 6.2 show the construction robots developed by the
general contractors in Japan during the last five years.
Beside these listed above, there are many more construction
machinery with types of automatic control system such as
automatic sliding form system and control system of several
cranes. Although many of the construction robots are low
level ones, they, at least, contribute to the
industrialization of the construction.
These robots can be roughly categorized into three
types. The first is automatic control of construction
machinery currently exists. Such effort was made since the
late 60's. For example, the self-leveling excavator was
developed in late 60's. These robots are economically very
prospective because the marginal investment to the machinery
is relatively small compared with other types of
construction robots. The bodies of such equipment are
usually developed before, and, therefore, their effort can
be concentrated on the control devices. Furthermore, they
can catch up with technical development relatively easily
because the added control system can be replaced by more
advanced control system at small additional costs.
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Table 6.2 Construction Robots by General Contractors
Year Activity of Construction Robot
1980 Concrete spraying machine for tunneling
1980 Concrete conveyor
1981 Re-bar processor
1982 Tower crane control system
1982 Automatic Excavator for slurry wall
1982 Exterior wall and window cleaning
1982 Concrete distributor
1982 Concrete conveyor
1982 Exterior inspector
1983 Automatic tunneling machine
1983 Automatic pebble compactor
1983 Rock wool sprayer
1983 Retention assembling robot
1983 Floor cleaning robot
1983 Remote control excavator
1983 Concrete distributor with crane function
1984 Automatic wire release for steel erection
1984 Re-bar placer
1984 Automatic sealed excavator
1985 Concrete finisher
Source: Kunimoto, 1984
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The second type of construction robots are those used
to handle fluid material such as concrete and rock wool. As
these materials are easy to feed and handle, and usually the
tolerance required for these tasks is larger than other
finishing material, they are technically easier to develop
compared with robots for handling concrete blocks, panels
etc.. Also their tasks are relatively well-structured.
The primary problem with these robots is their utilization
rate. In building construction, in particular, the amount
of such tasks are limited in a project and it is difficult
to utilize them at economically feasible levels.
The third type of construction robots are those that
trace and cover planner surface. These include: exterior
wall washing robots, exterior wall inspecting robots, floor
finishing robots and floor cleaning robots. They perform
simple tasks while they move along the surface. These
robots Have been developed because of the relatively well-
structured tasks and programmability of the movement.
6.6 Future Strategy to Develop Construction Robot
6.6.1 Productivity of Construction Investment
One of the primary objectives of introducing robots is
to increase productivity. So far, the productivity of
construction focuses usually on the productivity at
construction site or productivity of the construction
industry. However, to increase the productivity of
construction investment, the productivity at site
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manufacturing industries and service sectors must be taken
into consideration.
Figure 6.1 shows the schematic design of construction.
It shows that construction can be divided into two major
categories: tangible parts and intangible parts. Intangible
parts consist input from the service sector, such as design,
engineering and management services. Tangible parts consist
of raw materials and value added by the manufacturing
industry and the construction industry. Raw materials are
first processed by manufacturing industry and then assembled
by the construction industry. As the degree of processing
becomes higher, the value added by manufacturing industry
increases. Alternatively, as the degree of processing
becomes lower, value added by the construction industry
increases.
As the amount of raw materials used in construction do
not vary much depending on the technology involved in it, to
increase the productivity is to decrease the input other
than raw material. Input other than such material are
introduced from service sectors, value added by the
manufacturing industry and value added by the construction
industry.
Therefore, to increase the productivity of construction
is to make the most effective production system of design,
engineering, and management activity, value added by the
manufacturing industry and value added by the construction
industry.
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Figure 6.1 Schematic Design of Construction
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Source: Compiled by the author.
In the 60's most of the efforts to increase the
productivity were focused on productivity at construction
site by prefabrication of components. However, with all the
sophisticated prefabrication design, only few such systems
are still used now. It is most probably because the
prefabrication systems invented in 60's were not the most
effective, especially in terms of cost and production
procedure. It shows that to achieve industrialization of
the building by using robots, we must be careful about not
only what is feasible with in the given framework, but also
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what is the most effective production system including
design prefabrication, and construction at site.
To increase the productivity of construction investment
is to decrease the three areas in figure 6.1: input from
service sector, value added by the manufacturing industry
and value added by the construction industry. So far,
efforts to increase productivity have been made almost
independently of these sectors.
For example, by factory automation, manufacturing
industry has increased their productivity to produce
material and components used in construction industry. As
shown in chapter three, cost escalation of steel has been
far smaller than those of other input due to increased their
productivity. Also decreased input from manufacturing
industry in monetary terms in the input-output tables shows
their increased productivity compared with those of
construction industry.
Input from service sectors, however, is very difficult
to decrease due to the increased required quality for the
construction and the nature of service industry that depend
mainly on the human resources. Nevertheless, even in this
field, the use of computers has increased their productivity
at least in terms of quantity.
6.6.2 Strategies to Introduce Construction Robot
The first step to introduce construction robots is thus
to introduce them within the framework of construction
industry. To increase the productivity of value added by
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construction industry, labor and capital goods must be used
in the most economical way.
In that sense, capital intensity is the key to the
successful introduction of construction robots. If the
business, social and political environment do not allow
intensive investment in construction machinery, it will not
be economically feasible to invest in construction robots.
To attain the capital intensity, construction machinery must
be fully utilized to decrease the cost of capital goods per
production. Thus, capital intensity can only be attained by
the high utilization of construction machinery.
In Japan, as shown in chapters three and four, upward
economy during the 50's and 60's accelerated the capital
intensity of construction industry, especially in the large
size construction firms, and now they are prepared to
introduce robots.
In fact, many of construction robots are based on
conventional construction machinery. Movable construction
machinery is relatively easy for addition of control
devices. For example, excavators used for tunneling can
move on a track and therefore it is relatively easy to
control them by micro processor and increase their
productivity. Also sliding forms with automatic control
system is reported to have increased their productivity and
enabled to cut product duration [Ohbayashi Technical Report,
February, 1986].
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6.6.3 Cooperation Among Sectors
The second step of introducing robots in the
construction industry is attained by cooperation between two
or more sectors. By cooperation of two or more sectors,
construction robots can generate additional benefits rather
than limiting their activity in one sector: There are four
possible combination of sectors; 1) Construction industry
and service sector, 2) Construction industry and
manufacturing industry 3) manufacturing industry and service
sectors and 4) Construction industry, manufacturing
industry and service sectors. The third case, combination
of manufacturing industry and service sectors has achieved
increased productivity by using Computer Aided Design and
Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) especially in the
production of prefabricated houses. However, it is beyond
the framework of this thesis and only the rest three cases
are focused hereafter.
Case A Construction industry and service industry.
As shown in chapter three, increased importance of
input from the service industry indicates increased concern
to the quality of the project by owners. From the nature of
creative work by designers, engineers and managers, this
tendency cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, by cooperating
with the construction industry, both can increase their
productivity further. For example, as mentioned in chapter
five, quality control is an emerging field that has
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increased importance in recent years. The task of quality
control, which is more of service industry than of
construction industry, can be more effectively performed by
adding a measuring instrument to construction machinery.
Also Management Information System (MIS) could be more
effectively incorporated with such measuring instruments.
Another type of robots that belongs to this type is a robot
that processes rather raw material at the construction site
according to the construction documents. For example, there
are a few robots processing and placing re-bars at
construction site. If equipped with the compatibility of
Computer Aided Design (CAD), they can process and place re-
bars without going through the process of working drawing
just like some advanced steel fabricaters use numerical
control processor and eliminate this process. Also, it may
not be difficult to output the record of tasks for quality
control.
Thus, by providing robots with interface capability
with service sector, additional benefits can be generated,
and, therefore, it can be more profitable.
Case B Construction Industry and Manufacturing Industry
As mentioned earlier, the building system was
established at the specific point of time and at the
specific levels of production technology of both
construction industry and manufacturing industry. However,
once established, these systems work as open systems and
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are difficult to change because many participants are
involved in it, and require established coordination among
them.
One possibility to introduce robots in this framework
is to set a temporary assembly factory in a construction
site. Usually, the limitation of prefabrication is from the
size of the units. Bulky units are difficult to transport
physically and economically. The reason that volumetric
units for construction are not widely used stems from this
reason. Assembly yards at construction sites solve this
problem, and also enable the use of ready made industrial
robots because they only have to move in the limited area.
Also, to provide these robots with tracking systems may not
be very difficult and expensive because of the limited
working area.
For example, slab units can be fabricated by this
method. Steel beams and deck plates are assembled and then
electric conduit, ducting and other components attached to
slabs are assembled at this automated assembly yard.
Succeedingly, they are lifted by conventional crane to the
exact location. Another example is a robot that assembles
thick re-bars, which are commonly used in slurry wall and
power plants.
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The advantages of such kind of robotics applications
are as follows:
1) Limited area of robot operation.
2) Easy and intensive control.
3) Safer operation.
4) Relatively easy application of conventional
industrial robots.
Case C Construction, Manufacturing Industries
and Service Sectors
As mentioned earlier, cooperation of sectors enables to
save transaction of various information. If the
construction robots mentioned in case B have the
compatibility with the CAD/CAM system, it is more easier to
program them, to control them, and collect data for feed
back from them.
Thus, construction robots can be more effective if they
can cooperate with other sectors. For the further
development of construction robots, we must not limit
ourselves in the conventional framework of construction
industry. Only by cooperating with other sectors both in
the development phase and actual construction phase, the
most effective system can be attained.
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6.7 Summary of Chapter Six
1) Industrial robots have been actively introduced mainly
in manufacturing industry since early 70's.
2) The number of robots in Japan is greatest in the
developed countries.
3) Japanese industry, however, uses relatively lower level
robots effectively in Flexible Manufacturing Systems.
4) Construction Robots are still in the test phase.
5) Almost all construction robots are developed by
general contractors in Japan.
6) They use their advantages described in chapter five
fully to develop construction robots.
7) To develop construction robots, not only the
construction industry, but also other sectors, such as
material manufacturers, and design and engineering
sectors should be involved.
8) CAD/CAM and MIS work an essential role to make robots
effective.
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CHAPTER 7 JAPANESE CONTRACTORS IN OVERSEAS CONSTRUCTION
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the activities of Japanese contractors
in the overseas market are described. Topics include their
motivation, their market structure and the activity of large
size general contractors in particular.
7.2 Declining Domestic Market
As described in chapter two, the construction industry
in Japan faces decreasing domestic market. Nevertheless,
both residential and social stocked assets are far below the
average of developed countries. Therefore, there are
obvious needs for further construction. Thus, how can such
needs not be translated into construction demand? Unlike
many developing countries, both corporations and
individuals retain considerable amount of monetary assets.
In fact, many Japanese investors now look for investment
opportunities in the foreign countries.
There are two possible reasons for this decreasing
construction investment despite the need for construction.
The first reason is the structural changes in the
industries. Since the early 70's, simultaneously with the
gravity of industry shifting from heavy industry to so-
called "high-tech" industries, construction investment as a
part of fixed capital formation has decreased significantly
as shown in chapter two. To produce such products as IC
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tips requires investment in machinery rather than investment
in factories.
Furthermore, as the Japanese industry in the overseas
market becomes more and more competitive, trade imbalances
are increasing. It has caused serious economic, political
and business problems, both in the importing countries and
exporting countries. As a result, Japanese manufacturing
industries came to the point that they export production
facilities and technical know-how rather than their product.
According to the Ministry of Finance, foreign direct
investment by the Japanese manufacturing industry has
increased from 819 million dollar in 1974 to 2,278 million
dollar in 1981. Among it, the proportion of investment in
developed country to the total investment also has increased
from 25.1 percent in 1974 to 54.9 percent in 1981. Thus,
the Japanese manufacturing industry began to invest not in
Japan but in the foreign country in order to ease trade
frictions.
Secondly, the limited supply of land for construction
seriously has affected the domestic construction investment
especially in the metropolitan Tokyo area. In fact, supply
of land for housing has decreased from 23,400 ha in 1972 to
9,800 ha in 1983 as shown in figure 7.1. Land supply by the
private sector in particular has decreased from 18,300 ha in
1973 to 6,700 ha in 1983. This limited supply of land has
attrcted many speculative investors, which has escalated
the land acquisition cost incredibly. In the suburbs of
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Tokyo, the cost of land acquisition is four to five times as
much as the construction cost. Such cost escalation
undoubtedly discouraged investing in residential
construction.
This sharp escaltion of land cost is observed in the
commercial area also, particularly in downtown Tokyo. It
impedes sound development of the urban functions. In fact,
the most expensive land in the world is Ginza district of
Tokyo as of 1985 [The Nihonkeizai Shinbun, April 1, 1986].
According to The Nihonkeizai Shinbun, the increasing land
acquisition cost is due to active demand of office space by
foreign enterprises and speculative investment in land.
The land acquisition cost of commercial areas in down-
town Tokyo has increased 54 percent and 31 percent in 1985
and 1984 respectively [The Asahi, April 1 1986]. Therefore,
It has more than doubled during the last two years.
Furthermore, the data for these land costs is published
by government agencies for taxing purposes, and, therefore,
it actually understates the actual transaction cost. The
actual cost escalation is said to have more than doubled in
one year [The Asahi, April 1, 1986]. This serious cost
escalation becomes more significant compared with the
relatively stable consumer price index in Japan.
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Figure 7.1 Land Supply for Residential in Japan
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These extraordinary cost escalations indicate poor
environment as follows:
politicians make money from such cost escalation by
brokerage of land, and 2) the policy to stabilize land
cost is not very helpful in election. Furthermore,
they stimulate such escalation by selling government
owned land which was $160 per sf. ten years ago at2-t $4500 this year [ The Asahi, April , 1986].political
Thus, poor political environment has disturbed the
sound development of both residential and commercial area in
the metropolitan Tokyo district and, consequently, the
need for construction does not generate proportional
construction investment. In this sense, Japanese
construction investment. In this sense, Japanese
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construction industry is not "mature" in comparison to the
U.S. construction industry. Nevertheless, there is not much
possibility that domestic construction investment can become
active again because of the very stable political
conditions.
The motivation for general contractors to enter into
the overseas construction market is to make up for the
decreasing domestic market and to utilize their surplus
resources including human resources and capital goods.
According to Hasegawa [1985] all the top general contractor
utilize only 60 to 70 percent of their capacities recent
years.
7.3 Overseas Construction after the Oil Crisis
After the first oil crisis, Japanese contractors had
successfully increased there work in the overseas
construction market. Figure 7.2 shows the amount of
contracts awarded to Japanese contractors in the foreign
countries since 1965. As shown, it had increased
significantly from 170 billion yen in 1973 to 1014 billion
yen during the period between 1973 and 1983 in nominal
terms.
The area of their operation is shown in figure 7.2 as
percentage of total. During the 70's, the share of both
Middle East and Asia accounted for about 40 percent of the
total. Contracts awarded in the Middle East, in particular,
seemed to dominate the Japanese overseas construction market
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in the late 70's. However, since 1979, the share of Asia
countries has increased gradually to more than 70 percent in
1982. The most recent and remarkable trend is the
increasing share of the U.S.. In 1984, the U.S. share had
grown to more than 20 percent of the total Japanese overseas
contract for the first time.
Although the amount of overseas construction appears to
have increased continuously, The amount of contracts by
area has fluctuated considerably reflecting unstable
political, economical and social environment and the
changing world economy.
The amount of contracts by country shows even more
significant fluctuations, indicating difficulty in
establishing a stable market in the foreign countries.
Table 7.1 shows the top three countries for Japanese
overseas construction since 1972.
Figure 7.4 shows the type of projects performed by
Japanese contractors in the overseas market. Although it
fluctuates like any other data for overseas construction, an
increasing trend in building construction can be observed.
During the 60's the proportion of building construction was
about 15 percent, whereas in the 80's, it has grown almost
40 percent. On the contrary, heavy construction,
particularly large project such as dams and reclamation
works, has gradually decreased.
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Figure 7.2 Overseas Construction by Japanese Contractors
(Trillion yen)
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Table 7.1 Overseas Construction by Country
(The amount of contract and its Proportion)
YEAR Total Contract 1 2 3
(Billion yen)
Indonesia
11.2 21%
Brazil
65.7 38%
Iraq
29.1 17%
Hong Kong
60.3 17%
Singapore
47.8 12%
Iran
44.8 12%
Indonesia
84.6 17%
Iran
242.0 45%
Iraq
117.5 23%
Malaysia
157.8 22%
Hong Kong
246.1 27%
Singapore
260.6 26%
Singapore
10.0 19%
Malaysia
29.4 17%
Hong Kong
27.1 15%
Iraq
55.3 15%
U.A.E.
46.2 12%
Malaysia
8.1 15%
Taiwan
20.7 12%
Indonesia
21.1 12%
Singapore
51.4 14%
Kuwait
39.8 10%
Iraq Saudi Arabia
38.4 11% 36.0 10%
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
53.3
170.7
175.7
359.2
393.6
359.9
488.3
536.5
511.0
712.7
921.5
1014.0
32.6 6%
Hong Kong
43.2 8%
Hong Kong
43.2 6%
Singapore
141.1 15%
Indonesia
108.5 11%
Source: Overseas Construction Association of Japan, 1985.
Iraq
81.9 17%
Hong Kong
60.7 11%
Singapore
58.7 11%
Iraq
130.8 18%
Malaysia
163.6 18%
Malaysia
155.4 15%
Hong Kong
78.8 16%
Indonesia
m n,,
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Figure 7.4 Overseas Construction by Type of Project
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Simultaneously with the expansion of their operation,
Japanese contractors have established foreign subsidiaries
all over the world. As of 1983, the number of such
subsidiaries was 120 of which 29 were located in the U.S.
and 22 were settled in Malaysia. Almost 400 employees from
parent companies are working in these subsidiary employing
almost 3000 staffs. In addition, 600 employees are working
at their branch offices and 3300 employees are directly
involved in construction. Therefore, almost 4300 Japanese
employees are working in the foreign countries.
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Figure 7.5 Overseas Construction by the Big Five plus One
(Billion yen)
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The number of subsidiaries in the U.S. is
unproportionally greater than those in other countries. It
shows that Japanese contractors consider the U.S. market one
of the most prospective markets. Actually, overseas
construction by Japanese contractors in the U.S. has
gradually and steadily increased during the last five years.
171
7.4 Big Five in the Overseas Market
In the overseas construction market, the big five
general contractors do not dominate in the Japanese share
like they do in the domestic market. Figure 7.5 shows the
amount of foreign contracts by them. Although obvious
increasing trends can be observed, considerable fluctuations
are also observed in many firms.
Table 7.2 shows the amount of contract awarded to
Japanese firms by country and each general contractor's
share in it.
It shows that general contractors share the overseas
construction market for most countries. In many countries,
only a few contractors domonate the market. For example,
95 percent of contracts awarded to Japanese firms in Kuwait
were won by Shimizu-kensets and only Kumagai-gumi receives
contracts in Australia. There is no country where all the
big five contractors equally share contracts like they do in
the domestic market.
There are several reason for it. First of all, the
international market is so large that it is difficult for a
contractor to know everything about it. Therefore, through
preliminary studies, they focus on a few target countries
that have potential markets. They try to concentrate their
efforts on those specific countries rather than spreading
their efforts over the world.
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Table 7.2 Contractors Share by Country (1983)
Country (1) Contractor Contract (%)
Singapore
Malaysia
Indonesia
U.S.A.
Hong Kong
Kuwait
Australia
Saudi Arabia
Thailand
Algeria
Sri Lanka
Egypt
263.9 Goyo-kensetsu
*Takenaka-koumuten
*Ohbayashi-gumi
164.6 Hazama-gumi
*Kajima-kensetsu
Fudou-kensetsu
*Shimizu-kensetsu
*Takenaka-koumuten
114.3 Kumagai-gumi
*Taisei-kensetsu
*Ohbayashi-gumi
83.2 Aoki-kensetsu
*Ohbayashi-gumi
*Taisei-kensetsu
78.7 Nishimatsu-kensetsu
Fudou-kensetsu
Kumagai-gumi
Aoki-kensetsu
68.2 *Shimizu-kensetsu
54.2 Kumagai-gumi
54.0 Sato-kogyo
Goyo-kensetsu
*Taisei-kensetsu
21.7 *Takenaka-koumuten
*Ohbayashi-gumi
Tokyu-kensetsu
18.7 Hazama-gumi
17.5 *Taisei-kensetsu
Hazama-gumi
Toda-kensetsu
16.6 *Kajima-kensetsu
82.4
38.6
38.4
29.6
17.6
16.8
16.6
15.9
48.9
38.1
5.8
24.9
20.2
19.7
16.1
15.9
14.8
11.0
65.0
54.2
27.3
9.3
6.8
4.3
4.2
4.1
14.6
9.8
2.7
2.4
13.0
31.2%
14.6%
14.6%
18.0%
10.7%
10.2%
10.1%
9.7%
42.8%
33.3%
5.1%
29.9%
24.3%
23.7%
20.4%
20.2%
18.8%
14.0%
95.4%
100.0%
50.6%
17.2%
12.6%
19.9%
19.4%
18.9%
78.2%
56.1%
15.5%
13.7%
78.3%
Source: Ohbayashi Co., 1984
Note : Unit in billion yen
* One of the big five contractors
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The second reason is the magnitude of the project. As
the small project will not generate enough profit to cover
overhead costs, the size of international project is
usually larger than those in the domestic market.
Therefore, the fluctuations of projects are more significant
and result in unstable market share.
Third, as they usually have ad-hoc relationships with
the owners, they cannot receive orders continuously as in
the domestic market.
Finally, their type of project is a demand-push type
construction rather than a supply-pull type construction.
During the 70's they had made little effort to generate
demand in the foreign countries. What they have done was to
target those countries with "hot" construction markets.
Thus, although Japanese contractors have expanded their
operations in the overseas market as a whole, each
contractor had not penetrated the marked intensively enough
to establishe a stable market.
These facts suggest the theory of "a perfect market",
where everyone shares information equally. In such market,
only risk takers can expect higher returns. However, this
type of market hardly exists in the international
construction market. The chief reason for the inperfect
condition is the sheer geographical limitation which hinders
effective communication.
Such mal-distributiond of information discourages
Japanese contractors to form joint venture in the
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international construction. In fact, it seems very strange
that general contractors in Japan, that frequently form
joint venture in the domestic market even in a small
projects, rarely form joint venture in the international
projects that have greater volumes of construction and
higher risks.
General contractors have established a special
organization, the Overseas Construction Association of
Japan, Inc., in order to collect information from all over
the world and coordinate general contractors toward the
international projects. Nevertheless, it also does not
appear to function properly.
Thus, although they share the domestic market through
intra-industry coordination, they have not established ways
to share the international market. Therefore, the amount of
contracts fluctuate significantly as compared with that of
domestic market.
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7.5 Summary of Chapter Seven
1) Japanese contractors launched into overseas market
after the first oil crisis.
2) They have expanded their operation in the foreign
countries during the 70's and the early 80's.
3) The area where they have received contracts shifted
from The Middle East in 70's to Asia in the early 80's.
4) Although the amount of contracts are still limited,
contract in the developed countries has steadily
increased since the beginning of the 80's.
5) The type of project also has shifted from heavy
construction to building construction.
6) Contract volume of each country has fluctuated
significantly.
7) A few Japanese contractors share markets in a
overseas countries.
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
8.1 Conclusions
Throughout this thesis, the construction industries in
the U.S. and Japan are analyzed from various points of view.
There are many findings. Findings about the construction
industry in the national economy and the construction
establishments are summarized in table 8.1 and table 8.2
respectively.
From the result of the study, the economies of scale
appears to work for the construction industry in Japan;
Worker productivity increases as the size of establishment
increases in Japan because of the high capital intensity and
hierarchical subcontracting structure. The big five
contractors at the top of this hierarchical structure have
many characteristics which are categorized into three major
factors.
They are:
1) Customer oriented services
2) Technical advantages
3) Integrated services in the construction industry
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Table 8.1 Findings about Construction Industry
Japan U.S.A.
Market Size 20% of GNP 10% of GNP
Market Structure Private 60% Private 80%
Public 40% Public 20%
Residential 30% Residential 40%
Other Bldg. 30% Other Bldg. 30%
Heavy 40% Heavy 20%
Source: Compiled by the author
Table 8.2 Findings about Construction Establishments
Japan U.S.A.
Size Ranges wide Ranges very wide
Productivity Increases as the Same trend as Japan
of worker size of the firm but less significant
increases
Capital intensity Increases as the Peaks at the
size of the firm mid-size firms
increases
Productivity of About 6 for the Small size: 3 - 4
Capital majority Large size: 6
Proportion of 40% 25%
Subcontract
Compiled by the author
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1) Customer Oriented Services
Japanese large size contractors offer extensive
services for the owners such as design service and quality
control programs. They free the owners from the trouble
associated with the fragmented nature of the construction
industry such as coordination among the designers and
contractors. Their design service incorporated with other
divisions, CAD system, and quality control programs assure
the owners of having the best quality for the cost.
2) Technical Advantages
Due to the legal, physical, and social constraints,
Japanese general contractors are familiar with advanced
technologies such as up-down construction. The upward
economy before the oil crisis and less fluctuating
construction volumes for contractors allow them to invest
in construction machinery for advanced technologies. They
have acquired much know-how from such technology, which is
sometimes as important as the technology itself. This
technology development is supported by their engineering
divisions and R&D institutes.
3) Integrated Service in the Construction Industry
On one hand, their services extend far into service
oriented field, while on the other hand they are deeply
involved in the actual construction process through
organizing subcontractors. Such involvement appears in
their comparatively low accident frequency rate.
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Although some of these characteristics, such as
subcontracting groups, do not work in the overseas
construction, most of these properties are strong tools for
penetrating overseas markets.
So far, Japanese contractors have received orders
mainly from developing countries with intensive capital
investment. However, such demand-push markets do not last
very long as in the case of OPEC countries. They have
obvious needs to stabilize their overseas activity. One way
to stabilize fluctuations is to focus on the developed
countries where construction is more of supply-pull market.
In such markets, Japanese contractors will be able to fully
utilize their advantages.
In recent years, Japanese enterprises have searched for
investment opportunities more in the foreign countries.
Foreign direct investment by them has increased
significantly during the last decade, including those by
the manufacturing industry. It appears the best opportunity
to demonstrate their properties and to get accustomed to the
local problems of the construction such as building codes,
subcontractors, unions and public authority.
8.2 Future Researches
All through this thesis, the increased importance of
the role of service sectors in construction is observed.
these service sectors include: design, engineering ,
management, testing laboratories and financial. Actually,
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the properties of the Japanese contractors are not limited
in the conventional construction industry, but the
combination of the construction industry and the service
sectors. In the U.S., such services are more fragmented and
independent and are classified as a service sector.
In this thesis, these construction related service
sectors have not been discussed deeply. However, as this
trend will continue in the construction industry, each of
the sectors is worth further research.
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